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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION
During the 1990's in Western culture a range of animal issues have
become important. Some old ones have taken on a new urgency and
some new questions have emerged. The key philosophical question in
relation to non-human animals has been how are they distinct from
humans. The criteria of sentience, reason, tool-making, language, free
will and culture have all had their philosophical supporters. Yet the
recent studies of free ranging apes and monkeys challenge all these
criteria. The research on captive bonobos2 dolphins3 and parrots4 has
also raised questions about the uniqueness of language as a human trait.
This has led some to argue that there is a need to re-define species
boundaries or at least to re-think what it is that makes us human as
distinct from animal. While others take the view that even embarking on
the latter project is pointless and borne from human arrogance. Whatever
one's position, the certainties in this area are gone.
The ethical questions stride into view with the growing awareness of the
horrors of the expanding factory farm and as more young people turn to
vegetarianism there is a need to clarify the moral basis beyond just an
intuitive revulsion. The presentation of cannibalism as a theme in some
recent films,5 and as a reality in some on-going wars also deserves
comment.
Animal experimentation has been a source of concern for some time. The
setting up of ethics committees in the last two decades may to some
extent have dulled dissent. Yet this way of handling the ethical issues of
experimentation does have its critics.6 Also there has been very little
discussion of new techniques such as xenotransplantation and cloning.
Xenotransplantation is the transplantation of organs or tissues between
species, a procedure which is already in use and it is likely to expand
given the promise of greater success with advances in breeding programs
including the genetic engineering of animals, and immunology. The
successful cloning of sheep and monkeys is said to point to an early date
for the successful cloning of humans. There are some crying out for the
discussion of ethical issues concerning human cloning but surely we
need to consider these in relation to non-human animals too.
Vertebrate animals are usually the sole focus of ethicical discussions of
concerning animals in experimentation. Yet some Australian researchers,
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working on coral in the Great Barrier Reef have suggested that
invertebrate animals should also be considered.7
All of these ethical issues (and others such as zoos, pets and circuses)
raise not only specific questions about the food industry, about eating,
experimenting, teaching and recreation, but also the general question:
what is the basis, if any, for the moral consideration of animals and how
far does it extend? A range of new books have been published is this
area and it will no doubt become a central philosophical concern in the
future.
Another philosophical/ethical issue which has risen into prominence in
the 1990's is the link between speciesism and sexism, a theme taken up
by some of the writers in this issue, clearly negating the earlier feminist
fear that expressing concern for animals might work to strengthen a
woman/animal link and further denigrate women. Another issue is the
connection or conflict between animal advocates and environmentalists
or ecologists, an area which needs a great deal more work.
Submissions are invited on all of these areas, in fact any area of
philosophical or ethical concern related to animals.
Notes
1. See for instance, Jane Goodall, In the Shadow of Man, Revised
Edition (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1988); Dian Fossey, Gorillas in the
Mist (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1983) and Birute Galdikas, Reflections
of Eden (Victor Gollancz, London, 1995) and Donald R. Griffin, Animal
Minds (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992).
2. Sue Savage-Rumbaugh and Roger Lewin, Kanzi: The Ape at the
Brink of the Human Mind (Doubleday, London, 1994).
3. Louis Herman, 'Receptive Competencies in Language-Trained
Animals' in J. Rosenblatt, et al, eds. Advances in the study of behavior
(Academic Press, New York, 1987), pp.16-38.
4. I.M. Pepperberg, 'Referential Mapping: A Technique for Attaching
Functional Significance to the Innovative Utterances of an African Gray
Parrot (Psittacus erithacus)', Applied Psycholinguistics, 11, (1990),
pp.23-44.
5. For example, 'The Cook, the Thief, His Wife, Her Lover'.
6. See for instance, Denise Russell 'The Ethics of Animal Ethics
Committees', Proceedings of the Animals in Science Conference,
Monash University, 1995.
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7. Paul Marshall, 'Ethics for invertebrates'. ANZCCART News, 9, 1996,
p.6.
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LIVING WITH ANIMALS
Freya Mathews
'Without animals,' says Peter, a Maasai nomad interviewed in the New
Internationalist1, 'life isn't worth living'.
Sitting here in my inner-city backyard writing this, with a circle of
attentive little upturned canine and feline faces surrounding me, and my
cranky duck tugging at my shoelaces, I could not be in more heartfelt
agreement. But how many people today would share this sentiment? For
how many would it be football that makes life worth living, or cars, or
opera, or ice-skating? Is there anything to ground the conviction that I
want to defend here, that the company of non-human animals is a
necessary part of human life, in a way that football, cars, opera and iceskating manifestly are not, and that we relinquish or forego it at our
peril?
There are two parts to this question. The first is, is it important for us, for
our own well-being or the realization of our human potential, that we
live in intimate commensal relations with animals? The second is, is it
important for the environment that we live in such relations? Does the
world need us to continue to live in our ancestral communalism with
animals?
My view is that our present estrangement, as human beings, from both
the natural world (as evidenced in the environmental crisis) and from
ourselves (as evidenced in the intense neuroticization of life in
contemporary 'advanced' societies) is due at least in part to the
progressive removal of animals from our day-to-day urban reality;
consequently I shall argue that, in order to address both the
environmental crisis and our own crisis of consciousness, we need to
find ways of restoring animals to the human household.
I cannot hope here to exhaust the discussion invited by this question, or
even to do justice to its larger significance. I shall merely offer several
relatively straightforward arguments in favour of human-animal
commensality, and then offer a very personal reflection on the deeper
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cosmological significance of these relations, as this has unfolded for me
through my own experience.

Our Need for Animal Company
Firstly then, are intimate connections with animals foundational to our
human well-being? It is by now a well-established research finding that
people who enjoy the day-to-day friendship of animals, or who are,
according to contemporary parlance, 'pet owners'2, are healthier in
various respects than people who do not: they tend to visit the doctor less
frequently, use less medication, have lower cholesterol and blood
pressure levels, recover more quickly from illness and suffer less from
feelings of loneliness.3 Indeed, it has been estimated that 'pet ownership'
saves the Australian health care system one and a half billion dollars per
year.4
Why might this be so? One reason may be that companionate
relationships with animals defuse a lot of the socially generated pressure
in our lives. Animals are non-judgmental friends. They do not compete
with us. Hence we can relax with them, and enjoy spontaneous affection
and cathartic physical closeness: we can 'be ourselves' in the presence of
such companions, since they have no socially acquired expectations of
us. They offer us emotional and psychological release.
Friendships with animals may be stress-reducing in a further way.
Emotional involvement with creatures who do not share our human goals
and aspirations, our system of values, enables us to gain an external
perspective on those values. It enables us to imagine how odd or
arbitrary our human priorities might appear from a non-human
perspective. When revealed in this light, socially-prescribed imperatives
have less hold on us - we can achieve a certain distance from them, a
certain detachment. We become less driven, less enslaved to abstract
ideals and images, and hence more receptive to our actual bodily and
instinctual needs, more self-accepting, with all the implications for
health and healing that flow from this.
It does not seem too far-fetched, to me, to speculate that there may even
be a direct physiological dependence of humans on animal
companionship that would help to explain why people who enjoy that
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companionship are healthier than others. Some evolutionary theorists are
currently arguing that our ancestors' early genetic 'contract' with certain
animals - particularly dogs - enabled us to develop the characteristics
that now mark us as human. According to this theory5, it was our
association with dogs - which was initiated at least in part by the dogs
themselves, possibly as early as one hundred thousand years ago6 which enabled our ancestors to dispense with something that is otherwise
mandatory for mammalian predators, namely an acute sense of smell:
when dogs agreed to join us in the hunt, they could henceforth do our
sniffing for us. The advantage for us of delegating our scenting function
in this way was that we could thereby dispense with our muzzle. Sans
muzzle, we could achieve frontal vision, and hence improved hand-eye
co-ordination, where this in turn was a precondition for the development
of our tool-making capability. The retraction of the muzzle also entailed
the shrinkage and refinement of the tongue, which thereby became
capable of the short, highly differentiated sounds required for speech.
According to this theory then, it was through a functional interdependence with dogs that we became human. (This theory adds an
amazingly literal dimension to the Aboriginal myth of human origins
recounted so beautifully by Deborah Bird Rose in her book, Dingo
Makes Us Human.7) The deal for dogs, in this scenario, was of course
that they received board and lodgings; history has resoundingly
vindicated the proto-dogs' evolutionary choice.
If this evolutionary story is accepted - and the fact that nearly all known
human communities have included dogs helps to bear it out - then it is
possible that human beings have a physiological need for contact with
dogs. Our bodies may unconsciously respond to certain subtle canine
emanations, just as women's bodies, for instance, unconsciously respond
to the subtle menstrual signals emanating from their female house mates.
If our compact with dogs indeed rested on certain evolutionary
imperatives, then it is not unreasonable to suppose that that compact may
be reinforced by other more direct, physiological forms of interdependency. If all dogs were banished from our cities - and many
indignant citizens are calling for just such a ban - a massive malaise in
the human population might ensue. Such a malaise might take directly
physical form, such as immunological decline; recent evidence that
raising children without exposure to ('dirty') animals tends to weaken
their immune systems, where this renders them susceptible to allergies,
counts in favour of this kind of interpretation. But the malaise might
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also take a more psychological form - it might be more akin to the
depression which is already present in epidemic proportions in our
relatively animal-free 'advanced' industrial civilizations. It might
manifest as a vague sense of incompleteness or meaninglessness, leading
to emotional neediness and compensating material acquisitiveness. Or it
might be experienced as an existential loneliness which no amount of
intra-species socialising can assuage.
Consider the latter possibility for a moment. If we have lived in intimate
community with dogs, for instance, for anything up to a hundred
thousand years, wouldn't it be likely that we would have a distinct
psychological need for their company, a need that could not be satisfied
by human substitutes? Anyone who habitually walks in open spaces with
a close canine friend can testify to the unique appropriateness of dogs as
walking companions. Bounding along with infectious interest and joy in
their surroundings, they leave us free - free to think our own thoughts
and to observe those surroundings keenly ourselves - while nevertheless
staying faithfully within our orbit, maintaining an unobtrusive closeness
with us. Alternatively, anyone who has spent time in Aboriginal
settlements can testify to the feeling of comfort that a dog clan can lend
to a community, provided of course that the dogs are not themselves a
source of danger. Their constant mingling with the people, their presence
at meetings and their forays onto the football field, their barking and
carrying on amongst themselves on the margins of human activities, add
a safe, convivial and companionable dimension to life, a dimension that
has been entirely lost in the larger cities. Nor is it only dogs which
provide a distinctive quality of companionship. To sit in the garden with
an affectionate duck can afford a uniquely peaceful interlude in the daily
round. To travel with horses or camels can give a far richer sense of
journeying than can either solitary travel or travel with exclusively
human company.
In light of the emotional and psychological satisfactions that we have
experienced for thousands of years in the wider social world of the
'mixed community'8 of humans and animals then, isn't it reasonable to
assume that, deprived of these satisfactions, we moderns might feel
unfulfilled and obscurely lonely, even if we have never experienced
these satisfactions at first hand, for ourselves. And mightn't this
unfulfilment and loneliness contribute to the social malaise of modern
life?
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These are some of the reasons why it might be important for our own
well-being to continue the ancient human tradition of living in mixed
households or communities. But why might it be important for Nature
itself that we honour and maintain our ancestral commensal links with
animals?
Why Nature Needs Us to Live in Company with Animals
If animal companions help to make us less driven, competitive and
acquisitive, as I argued earlier, then their presence in our lives works
against the world-destroying ethos of capitalism, with its competitive
individualism and consumerism. That is to say, if animals help to bring
us down to earth, deflating our modern ambitions and pretensions by
exposing them to inter-species scrutiny, then we shall be less anxious to
remain in the race for success, wealth and power, where it is this race, on
a mass scale, which is driving the engines of capitalism. Indeed, to the
extent that we share our lives with animals, we shall not only be less
willing but less able to adapt to the regime of order and control,
efficiency and discipline, which is a prerequisite of capitalist production:
animals constantly disrupt our life and work with unpredictable
contingencies - escapes, fights, sudden illnesses, injuries, embarrassing
lapses. They bring an element of slapstick and anarchy into the cool,
smart, self-absorbed world of business and public affairs. They make us
miss work; they muss up the perfect clothes, perfect hair, that are needed
to assure our 'professionalism', our presentability, in this public world;
they strew shit and dirt around the manicured gardens, and leave paw
marks through the tidy houses, that announce our hard-won social status.
They gently lead us back from the obsessive quest which is definitive of
the modern ethos and which is at the root of the environmental crisis:
the quest to usurp and transcend Nature,9 to place ourselves above and
beyond its reach, to inhabit a kind of glossy advertiser's version of
Plato's heaven, in which moth and rust doth not corrupt, because they are
kept at bay by chemical warfare, and where thieves do not break in and
steal, because the place is patrolled by security guards. In other words,
by staying in touch with our animal kin, we stand a greater chance of
seeing through the dangerous illusions of a world increasingly dedicated
to capitalist ideals of wealth, power and success that are defined in stark
opposition to, or at the expense of, Nature.
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Another reason why, as environmentalists, we should encourage
commensal relations between animals and people, especially children, is
that such relations presumably help to engender human empathy towards
animals in general, including those in the wild. When people discover
the unique personalities and communicative capabilities of their animal
friends and familiars, they are logically drawn to credit other animals
with such potentialities too, and to extend to them, in principle, a degree
of consideration commensurate with that which, they have realised, is
due to the animals of their acquaintance. In this way, animal companions
can serve as 'ambassadors' for animal life generally, awakening in us new
levels of awareness and responsibility vis a vis the natural world.
It must be admitted, however, that this 'ambassador' argument is, prima
facie, open to objection. In the first place, what of the rural people,
whom we have all encountered, who have been in contact with animals
throughout their lives, yet who nevertheless treat all animals as totally
inconsiderable robots? Then there are the people who enjoy
companionate relationships with particular, privileged animals, yet
continue to handle the rest with callous indifference. How are we to
account for the fact that daily contact with animals has not, in these
instances, led to a more considerate attitude towards animals in general?
One way of accounting for this is via the hypothesis that it was the fact
of domestication itself, in its more grossly instrumental forms, which led
to our cultural objectification of animals. That is, according to some
theorists10, in drawing animals into our domiciliary space, and raising
them within the circle of the human clan, and then slaughtering them for
food or other purposes, we in fact violated the taboo against violence
towards kin. The moral gravity of this transgression then required that
we rationalize our action by denying the moral significance of domestic and by extension, other - animals, reducing them to the status of objects
that may be produced and consumed without the slightest compunction.
In other words, to justify the utilization of animals raised, like kin, within
the human domain, we invented an ideology of animals as objects, which
effectively closed our eyes to their otherwise manifest subjectivity.
Ideology unquestionably can blind us to the subjectivity of others, as is
plainly attested by the phenomena of slavery, racism and sexism in the
human context. So the mere fact that we keep 'pets', or come into daily
contact with other animals, will not of itself ensure that we develop
empathy for them. Communication between self and other can occur only
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when occlusive ideologies have been exposed and removed. For
companion animals to serve as moral 'ambassadors' for the animal world
at large then, anthropocentric prejudices have first to be set aside.
If it is accepted that companion animals do induce in us a new moral
seriousness about animals generally, then a question arises concerning
the status of domestic animals used for productive purposes . Does this
new moral seriousness condemn the utilization of animals for such
purposes? If so, is it really in the interests of the species in question,
since those species owe their very existence, at the present time, to the
fact that they are so utilized. How ironical it would be if the dawning of
this new moral seriousness led not to an animal renaissance, but to the
further retreat of animals both from their present evolutionary
strongholds and from our own lives? The question then, is whether it is
possible to reconcile empathy for animals with their domestic
utilization?
The short answer to this question is, I think, that such reconciliation of
empathy and use is possible to the extent that utilization is of net benefit
to the animals concerned. When those animals are considered as species
rather than as individuals, it is clear that productive forms of
domestication have been of net benefit to them: domestic animals are
some of the few animal species still flourishing in a world of declining
biodiversity. However, the kind of empathy induced by intimate
relationships with animal companions leads us to consider animals as
individuals rather than as mere instances of species. So although
reproductive success at the level of species is obviously a necessary
condition for an individual's existence, and is in this sense in its interests,
it is, equally obviously, not a sufficient condition for the individual's
well-being.
To reconcile utilization with empathy, we need to be assured that the life
that our exploitative intentions bestow on an individual domestic animal
affords both the experiential opportunities and the requisite life span to
enable it to achieve a significant degree of the form of self-realization
appropriate to its particular kind. This implies that the use we may
justifiably make of animals will vary according to their species: what
may be an acceptable use of one species with a particular set of needs
and sensibilities may not be acceptable for a species differently
endowed. In particular, while humane killing of animals who lack any
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consciousness of death may be admissible, the killing of animals who
understand and fear death, and who grieve for their own dead (as do
elephants and perhaps chimps), may be completely inadmissible,
involving as it would the systematic infliction of intolerable suffering.
Such suffering may, from the point of view of the animals in question,
cancel the benefits of being alive. (This is evidenced by the fact that such
animals can pine to death when bereaved11).
In short, I think the fact that domestic utilization affords evolutionary
niches for certain species, in a world of disappearing niches, is a prima
facie reason for regarding such utilization as compatible with respect.
However a full-blown attitude of empathy - such as we develop through
intimate association with animal companions - requires that the forms of
utilization we countenance be compatible with the self-realization of the
animals used, where this implies that different forms and degrees of
utilization will be appropriate for different species. I would also add that,
once we have acknowledged the subjectivity and moral significance of
the animals we use, and the moral gravity of our practices of utilization,
it becomes incumbent on us to develop cultural expressions of respect,
gratitude and indebtedness for the lives we have thus dedicated to our
own ends. In this way, our attitude towards domestic animals can
develop more affinity with the familial attitudes of hunter-gatherer
peoples towards the wild species that constitute their prey.
When domestic utilization of animals is subject to the qualifications I
have outlined above, I think it is not only consistent with empathetic
concern for the interests of animals: it is actually required by such
concern. As environmentalists, committed to the maximal preservation of
non-human life on earth, yet facing the cold, hard fact that in the 21st
century, the processes of urbanization and industrialization that have
been synonymous with the disenchantment and tragic devastation of the
non-human world are only going to accelerate and intensify, don't we
have to admit that one of our best chances for 'saving Nature' is by
bringing Nature back into the human domain. We have, for the last few
centuries, witnessed the runaway humanization of Nature; now let us
inaugurate the wholesale naturalization of human habitat. Our cities are
one of the major biological habitats of the future, and our task, as
environmentalists, is to ensure that they provide the best opportunities
for non-human life that we can devise. We can do this partly by
increasing the amount of urban habitat for wildlife. Such habitat can be
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created by way of indigenous plantings and by permacultural programs
of food production in the city. Buildings can also be designed or adapted
to create, rather than exclude, habitat opportunities for wild animals (by
way of stork-friendly chimneys, for instance, and roofs that
accommodate bats and nesting birds). However we can also increase the
urban opportunities for non-human life by finding new ways for animals
to 'earn their living' in the city.
How might we envisage some of these new ways? The usefulness of
sheep as lawn-mowers has been appreciated by a church in my own local
neighborhood, and there is no reason why other urban land-holders,
including local councils, should not follow suit. Sheep have also been
used for traffic calming in the Netherlands, and strategic use of horsedrawn vehicles - for tourist rides or milk deliveries, for instance - could
serve a similar purpose. City farms afford educational opportunities for
urban schoolchildren increasingly distanced from the realities of food
production. The possibilities for reintegrating animals productively into
urban life are as limitless as our imaginations. However, the principal
way in which animals can 'earn their living' in the city is still, I think, via
their companionate role. The exclusive reign of the dog and the cat in
this connection needs to be challenged, and the adaptability of other
species to the human hearth and home investigated. There is immense
scope for the conservation particularly of - sometimes endangered native species in such a program of domestication. Species such as the
quoll, or native cat, and the fruit bat, are reputed to make affectionate
and contented hearth companions, and the domestic potentialities of
many smaller, endangered wallabies, such as quokkas and bettongs, are,
so far as I am aware, relatively unexplored. (The quokkas on Rottnest
Island, offshore from Perth, Western Australia, have already adapted to
the kind of semi-tame, dump-side existence which is, according to
certain evolutionary theorists12, the first step in a species' self-surrender
to domestication.) Our reluctance, as 'animal lovers', to countenance
confinement of wild animals, and the loss of autonomy that
domestication entails, must be off-set, I think, by the recognition that we
are just another niche in the biosphere, and hence ourselves a part of
Nature (the niche in question being one which many species have in the
past successfully occupied of their own free will). This reluctance must
also be offset against the as yet undreamt-of possibilities for
conservation13 that domestication offers.
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The 'green' city of the future, then, would be a mixed community rich in
habitat opportunities for a great diversity of animal species. This
reintegration of animals into human life would also help to expand
human imaginative and empathetic horizons, undermining
anthropocentrism and reinforcing commitment to the protection of the
non-human world. At the same time, the multiple contacts with animals
that it would afford would enhance the health and sanity of the human
population.
To envisage the green city of the future as a mixed community in this
way would of course involve considerable re-thinking of current urban
and environmental planning principles. Restrictions on the ownership of
native animals would have to be revised, and new local council
regulations allowing for the responsible keeping of a wide range of 'pets'
would be required. Housing would be designed with the needs of both
wild and tame non-human occupants in mind. Such demands on design
would not in themselves militate against the medium density housing
currently favoured by environmental town planners, but they would
require that 'urban consolidation' be counter-balanced by large increases
in communal green space. Public spaces would also have to be rendered
more hospitable to animals, with protection from traffic, and areas
designated and set aside for inter-species exercise (dogs would
presumably have to be kept apart from donkeys, miniature pigs and
quokkas, for instance!). Urban planners who currently concentrate on
high density development for the sake of energy conservation and
curtailment of urban sprawl forget that, in excluding non-human beings
from the city and creating human ghettos, they are intensifying the
anthropocentric mind-set of urban populations, and thereby reinforcing
the deepest roots of the environmental crisis. The green city is one which
not only conserves energy and utilizes existing infrastructure, but also
challenges the traditional conceptual division between humankind and
Nature, making itself a frontier of ecological possibility and opening its
people to the degree of contact with non-human life required to awaken
their ecological sensibilities.
A Responsive World: Some Personal Reflections
These then are some of the reasons why I think that our living with
animals is important both for us and for them. However, this
commensality shapes not only our ethical attitudes towards non-human
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individuals and species, but our very sense of the world. I have not yet
brought this larger significance of the relationship fully to light, nor can I
hope to do so with any pretence of completeness. In order to capture a
little of this cosmological significance however, I would like to recount,
in these concluding pages, the experiential origins of my own conviction
that 'without animals, life isn't worth living'.
I grew up surrounded by loving animals on what today would be
described as a hobby farm, situated on the rural outskirts of Melbourne,
Australia.. These animals included dogs and cats, ducks, geese, hens,
and, at one stage, a turkey. There were brief episodes with sheep and
cows. The main focus of my entire childhood, however, was my ponies.
My first pony, and the horses that came after her, were my day-long
playmates and confidants. It was to them that I recited my earliest poems,
and to them that I ran when I was hurt or excited. They nuzzled me in the
same soft, considerate way whatever the occasion. I chose their company
not for want of family and friends, but for its own sake. The form of
intimacy that grew up between us was qualitatively different from
anything that could have developed between myself and human persons.
It was a kind of uncluttered closeness, or being-with, which existed
despite the fact that our subjectivities were, in terms of content, mutually
unknowable. We took it for granted, on either side, that this
unknowability did not matter, that our psyches could touch and pervade
each other, without need for explanations or self-disclosures, such as
those conveyable by language. These animals were, for me, 'primary
others', in the psychoanalytic sense; they were not substitutes for, but
additional to, significant humans, nor could humans substitute for them.
My subjectivity - my sense of self and world - was constituted through
my 'object relations'14 with these animals just as fundamentally as it was
through my relations with primary human others.
Domestic animals were not the only non-human influences shaping my
sense of self and world in those early days. There were also kindly
ancient gum trees on our land - we knew they dated from before
colonization because they bore canoe scars in their trunks. And there was
the creek, steeped in elemental mystery for me, yet at the same time busy
and loquacious, swirling with news of other unknown yet connected
places. These, together with my animal family, and the wild birds and
snakes, all contributed to my sense of a world of communicative
presences beyond the circle of human concerns.
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Nor was my childhood home the only place which turned my psyche
outward in this way. There was also an old sheep station on the vast
western plains of New South Wales, which I occasionally visited in
school holidays. It was no ordinary sheep station, but, even in those days,
a relic of an earlier era. The owner, an old timer with eyes as wide as the
blue desert sky, had been born in the homestead and raised on the
property, and he ran the place in the pre-mechanical style, with the aid of
stock ponies, dogs and horse-drawn buggies. We children were out all
day in the searing sun on the saltbush plains, lunching out of battered
tuckerboxes, racing our ponies, chasing kangaroos, emus and wild pigs
with delirious excitement. Back at the homestead, animals filled our
every waking moment: there were sheep and lambs, of course, as well as
the ponies, most of whom spent the main part of the year in a large herd
out on the range, only coming in for a tour of duty now and again, as the
need arose. (These tough but happy little horses lived to extraordinary
ages. One died recently at the age of forty-five!) Cattle, pigs, tribes of
chooks, ducks and geese, a flock of diminutive long-haired bush goats,
an army of dogs, and at different times tame emus and kangaroos all
congregated around the homestead. An old white goat named Snowy and
a cocoa-coloured hand-reared filly clattered about on the wide back
verandah. A sack containing a recently orphan joey usually hung from
the clothes line over the enormous wood-fired stove in the kitchen.
Compassion and fondness for animals jostled, in the daily round, with
unabashed slaughter and brutality. From my saddle, I witnessed mother
kangaroos being torn to shreds by dogs, 'for fun'; emus, in flight from our
young stockman friends, failing to clear a fence, becoming entangled in
the wire instead, and being bludgeoned to death with a fence-post; and
back at the homestead, pigs uttering torture-chamber screams as their
throats were cut and their still-convulsing bodies dropped into troughs of
scalding water. I sat with the other kids in the back of a jeep on a
kangaroo-shooting excursion, and as the bodies piled up under our feet, I
remember the blood of the kangaroos soaking my green felt boots dark
red. The cruelty shocked me to the core - in fact, it was this which first
made me aware of my core, a still, silent, inner place of watching,
beyond speech. But it did not diminish the overwhelming sense of
enchantment that this place awakened in me. (Much, much later, I was to
discover that the old station had had a similar effect on many of the
people who had been associated with it.) For the enchantment, and the
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heightened feeling of being alive that accompanied it, arose from the fact
that animals - and the uncompromising land which decided their fate were the almost exclusive focus of everyone's life there, and the carnage,
for all its horror, was part of that all-consuming involvement.
When I was fifteen, my family moved into the inner city, and both my
rural life, and my visits to the sheep station, ceased. However our new
home overlooked extensive parklands, and I set up house with a dog in
an old Victorian loft in our backyard, so the transition was not unduly
traumatic. It was not until I was eighteen, and I abandoned my home and
my country to live in London, that a keen sense of loss and deprivation at
last set in. I moved in with a friend who leased a top-storey studio in the
Kings Road in Chelsea, and for various reasons I was soon trapped in the
life I had reluctantly chosen to lead there. The apartment was without a
garden, without the slightest glimpse of green from its high windows.
The grand old building in which it was located was legendary as one of
the nerve-centres of the London 'underground'. Artists, writers and rock
musicians congregated there, and every night, till dawn, the entire
building was shaken with musical reverberations from the nightclub in
the basement. People were embarked on what were for them exciting
adventures with sex and drugs. The joint was unquestionably jumping.
With comings and goings at all hours, residents and visitors alike were
charged to the eyeballs with the fizz of glamour, the intoxication of
notoriety and celebrity.
I alone, it seemed, languished. I felt deadened. Without any trees in
sight, with all presence and memory of animals expunged from this
world, without even a proper sky above me (the London sky appearing
more like a low ceiling than the soaring invitation to infinity to which I
was accustomed in Australia), I felt truly 'underground', buried alive. My
spirit, with its lifelong habit of expansiveness, had to submit for the first
time to grey urban confinement, to a world built exclusively to human
specifications, in which no court of appeal existed beyond sociallyprescribed perceptions and perspectives. There was here no turning out
to a wider world of subtle voices and signals, a world of myriad, at first
indiscernible, but with patient attention increasingly differentiated,
responsive presences. Rather, there was a turning in, and a turning up of
the volume of human-generated and human-directed self-infatuated
cacophony and chatter. This turning-in found its ultimate expression in
the essential project of the counter-culture: to transform reality into an
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inner picture show, a spectacle of hallucinatory images and sexually
induced sensations orchestrated for our private entertainment. This
project was, in fact, nothing more than a hip rendition of the old
transcendental idealism, or solipsistic anthropocentrism, of the Western
tradition, which places reality in us rather than us in reality.
I had no words, at the time, to name this human introjection of reality, or
to justify my sense of exile from a world that was truly alive, and, unlike
the one in which I found myself, a source of true enlivenment. I
especially had no words to challenge the high claims of Art on which the
counter-culture rested. Instead, I kept some snails and bare twigs in a jar
in my room, and gazed at them for months. I retreated into a state of
fantasy and intense creativity, writing and drawing obsessively, calling
up from my own deep unconscious the images and motifs I needed to
survive. I composed song cycles, and stories of origins, before I had
heard of Aboriginal dreamings. I hung around old book shops and
antique stores, seeking out illustrations and folk tales that could be
threaded into my nascent mythologies. I haunted the Natural History
Museum in South Kensington, with its layer upon layer, colonnade after
colonnade, of magical animal statuary. Whenever I found a numinous
image - an old French engraving of a lone seal, for instance, or a Chinese
painting of wild geese - I enshrined it, hanging it as a religious icon in
the gallery of my mind. Out of such gathered fragments, and out of my
own memory, imagination and dreams, I tried to recreate the sense of
enchantment that had always been the essence of my experience of the
world, and without which I did indeed find life scarcely worth living.
From the viewpoint of Western psychoanalysis, this sense of
enchantment is regressive, and signals a failure of individuation in
infancy. But to adopt this point of view is, of course, to beg the
metaphysical question. Looking back on my early years now, it seems
more plausible to me to assume that the ample opportunities for close
communion with animals that were available to me throughout my
childhood had opened me to a larger world, a world astir with presence
or presences that vastly exceeded the human. It was this direct contact
with unknowable but pervasive presence which instilled in me a sense of
the sacredness or enchantment of the world, and the potentiality for
'magic' within it. 'Magic' was, in this context, just the possibility of the
world's response - the possibility, indeed probability, that the world,
when invoked in good faith, will respond, though not necessarily in the
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manner one anticipates or with the results for which one hopes. One
should certainly not, in my view, rely on this world to fulfil requests or
afford protection, but if one entreats it simply to reveal itself, to engage
in an act of communication, then, in my experience, it will generally do
so, though in its own ever-unpredictable way. I learned this as a child,
through the receptiveness that my animal familiars created in me, and it
filled my whole being with a sense of being accompanied, of never being
alone, a sense of background love, akin to the background radiation of
which physicists speak. This is a 'love' which has nothing to do with
saving us from death and suffering, or with making us happy. From the
viewpoint of the world, death and suffering are just inevitable
concomitants of individual life. The point for individuals, from this
perspective, is not to seek to evade these inevitabilities, but to reach
beyond them - to call into the silence beyond human selfhood in search
of a reply. This is the moment for which the world has been waiting, and
in which it will rejoice: the moment when we ask it to speak. To receive
its reply is to enter a love far greater than the kind of protection and
indulgence that our traditional importunate forms of prayer expect, for
that reply signifies that we belong to an animate order, a pattern of
meaning, from which death cannot separate us, and to which suffering
only summons us.
I offer these concluding reflections, not as argument, but as testimony
relating to my own personal sense of the larger import of human-animal
commensality, especially when that commensality is established in
childhood. To engage with the unknowable subjectivities of animals, and
to experience their response to us, is perhaps the principal bridge to
communication with the unknowable subjectivity of the wider world. To
experience the world thus, as an ensouled or spiritual thing, will not only
direct the course of our own self-realization in the most fundamental
way; it will also ensure an attitude of profound mutuality and awed
protectiveness towards the world itself.

Notes
1. Nikkivan der Gaag, 'The Maasai and the Travellers', New
Internationalist, 266, (1995), pp. 24-25.
2. Throughout this paper I shall avoid the demeaning term 'pet', as well
as the problematic assumption that we can 'own' animals.
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3. Information supplied by Australian Companion Animal Council.
4. Reported on 'The Science Show', third episode of a series entitled
'Animal Friends', written and narrated by Dr Jonica Newby, broadcast on
ABC Radio National on 15 Feb 1997; also reported on 'Australia Talks
Back', ABC Radio National, 12 February 1997.
5. Reported on The Science Show, first episode of the series, 'Animal
Friends',1 Feb 1997.
6. The theory that many of our present day domestic animals initiated
the process of domestication themselves, in pursuit of their own
evolutionary advantage, has been explored at length in Stephen
Budiansky, Covenant with the Wild (William Morrow, New York,
1992).
7. Deborah Bird Rose, Dingo Makes Us Human (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1992).
8. 'Mixed community' is Arne Naess' term. See Arne Naess, 'Selfrealization in Mixed Communities of Humans, Bears, Sheep and
Wolves', Inquiry 22, (1979), pp. 231-241.
9. Many works could be cited in support of this account of modernity;
see, for instance, Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature, (Harper and
Row, San Francisco, 1980); Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery
of Nature (Routledge, London, 1993), Chapters 1 and 2; Freya Mathews,
The Ecological Self (Routledge, London, 1991), Chapter 1.
10.. James Serpell, In the Company of Animals (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1996), Chapter 11.
11. See, for instance, the account of elephant's consciousness of death
in Joyce Poole, Coming of Age with Elephants (Hodder and Stoughton,
London, 1996), Chapter 19; for a more ambivalent account of
chimpanzee attitudes, see Jane Goodall, In the Shadow of Man (William
Collins, Glasgow, 1971).
12. See Budiansky, op cit.
13. I am not of course implying here that the movement to maximize
urban biodiversity should replace wilderness preservation and the
promotion of wildlife refugia. I am only suggesting that in a world in
which competition for 'undeveloped' space is progressively going to
intensify, we need to begin to tap the ecological potential of the
'developed' space.
14. The term 'object relations' is deployed in a branch of psychoanalytic
theory, known as 'object relations theory', to designate the kinds of
relations with primary others that an infant internalizes in the process of
developing its individual sense of self. It is associated with the work of
D.W. Winnicott, and later feminist theorists, such as Nancy Chodorow.
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BABE: THE TALE OF THE SPEAKING MEAT
Val Plumwood
'You look a little shy: let me introduce you to that leg
of mutton,' said the Red Queen. Alice-Mutton: MuttonAlice'. The leg of mutton got up in the dish and made a
little bow to Alice, and Alice returned the bow, not
knowing whether to be frightened or amused.
'May I give you a slice?' she said, taking up the a slice?'
she said, taking up the knife and fork, and looking from one
Queen to the other.
'Certainly not,' the Red Queen said, very decidedly: 'it
isn't etiquette to cut anyone you've been introduced to.
Remove the joint!'
Alice Through the Looking Glass
Part 1
1. The Unprejudiced Heart
2. The Paradox of the Speaking Meat
3. The Communicative Model
Part 11

- in next issue of this journal

4. Communication and Anthropomorphism
5. Meat and the Colonising Contract

1 : The Unprejudiced Heart
I would like somebody somewhere to endow an annual prize for a work
of art which takes a group of the most oppressed subjects and makes an
effective and transformative representation of their situation. The work
would make its audience care about what happens to those oppressed
subjects and to understand something of the audience's own role in
maintaining their oppression. It would foster recognition of the
subjectivity and creativity of the oppressed group and consciousness of
the need for redistribution of respect and of cultural and material goods.
Above all, it would help to support and protect them. If these are subjects
who are conventionally seen as radically excluded, for example as
beyond the possibility of communication or as embodied in ways which
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occasion aversion or anxiety, the prize work should attempt to disrupt
those violence-prone perceptions.
One of my nominations for such a prize would be the film Babe. Before
seeing the film, I would have doubted that it was possible to make a
highly successful film for mass audiences that could do those things for
one of the most oppressed subjects in our society, the meat pig. One
feature that made this achievement possible was that the film
successfully disrupted the adult/child boundary and created space for
adults to share certain kinds of openness to and sympathy for animals,
permitted to children but normally out of bounds for mature adults. This
is one of the devices which enables the film, like Dick King-Smith's
prize-winning book The Sheep-Pig on which it is based1, to succeed to a
remarkable degree in opening for the pig the 'unprejudiced heart' invoked
in the narrator's opening sentence. It is not just the film's
problematisation of the concept of meat that makes this film
philosophically interesting; it also poses many ethico-political questions,
analogous to questions in post-colonial theory, about the distinction
between meat and non-meat animals and the role of the human contract
with those special more privileged 'pet' animals who can never be 'meat'.
Because the main theme of Babe turns around the refusal of
communicative status to animals, the film is of considerable interest for
philosophical accounts of human-animal relations. The story provides a
rich context for thinking about this communicative status, about the
inadequacy of narrow rationalist accounts of communication, about
representations of animal communication and the charge of
anthropomorphism, and about the contradictions and paradoxes
disclosed when we recognise the meat as a communicative subject. Babe
repeatedly problematises the kind of prejudice that relegates the other
that is our food to the category of 'meat', a sphere of radical otherness
marked by rational
deficiency, reduction to an impoverished,
mechanistic concept of 'body', and exclusion from communicative
status. The pig Babe soon talks his way smartly around the assumption
that because he is a meat animal, he is 'too stupid to understand'; the
storyline refutes the sheep-dog Fly's dismissal of sheep-talk as 'just so
much rubbish, to which she never paid any attention'. The refusal of
communicative status to animals is a crucial, formative arena where
radical exclusion and silencing strategies which affect both humans and
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animals are developed and perfected. Babe thus provides many insights
into closure strategies as they affect both humans and nonhumans.
Babe also offers a recognition of communicative virtues and
characteristics as central to both human and nonhuman forms of life, and
offers a vision of the emergence of communicative forms of relationship
as victorious alternatives to forms based on violence, domination and
terror. The film does not explore the ethical and political ambiguities of
communicative forms, which are potentially rather more compatible with
oppression than it suggests, and are implicated in the replacement of
repressive patriarchal models by hegemonic models based on the master
subject, as in certain forms of liberal democratic politics for example.
But as Dryzek2 and Plumwood3 have argued, communicative models of
relationships with nature and animals seem likely to offer us a better
chance of survival in the difficult times ahead than dominant
mechanistic models which promote insensitivity to the others' agency
and denial of our dependency on them. Babe crystallises in a useful way
a clash of models that is critical for our times.
My initial reason for going to the movie however had less to do with
millennial models and more to do with being homesick -- I was away
from Australia for a long period and the film had been shot in a shire
near my home. I hoped to hear again the sounds of the bush -- those
small but intensely evocative background calls -- especially the local
birds and frogs which appear in the background on most soundtracks -that creep up on you unawares to create powerful longings for a muchloved place. But when I took my seat in the darkened cinema,
something else made me cry too, with sorrow and shame for my own
complicity in the dominant cultural tradition of rational human mastery
over animals and nature -- as well as everything else considered beneath
the master realm of reason. These were the powerful opening scenes of
Babe showing the terrible cruelty of the intensive pig farms in which the
pig Babe, treated as living meat, is introduced to us as narrative subject.
These visions of hell took on special power and poignancy for me
because at the time I saw the film, I was living in the second highest
U.S. state for intensive hog production. The state of North Carolina was
a place where one rarely saw farm animals out in the open and many of
the rivers and estuaries were seriously degraded or under assault from
the toxic run-off generated by the intensive factory farms. Many of the
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huge pig 'slaughter facilities' in the U.S. employ largely prison labour.
The work of those who labour on the killing floor of these massive
facilities slaughtering up to 15,000 pigs a day is so terrible and poorly
paid that only the slave-like workforce of the carceral system, or those
coerced by other forms of desperation such as indentured immigrants,
are available as workers. The concentration camps too employed some
categories of prisoners to organise, imprison and execute others. The
treatment of the pigs and that of the prisoners has much in common; in
both cases, the intense segregation of the gulag ensures that the middle
class rarely has to confront the hidden connection between its ugly and
violent reality and their own comfortable and tidy lives. The speech of
both pigs and prisoners is erased or delegitimated, and both are reduced
to living meat. As C. Stone Brown argues, 'African Americans are the
flesh that maintains a profitable "prison industry".'4 As disciplinary
democracy normalises massive incarceration and more of us become
either prisoners or keepers, the fate of nonhuman and human prisoners
increasingly converges.
The nightmarish opening scenes of Babe showed an ugly gulag reality
that was all around but which was banished from thought and sight, and
generally treated, even by the animal liberation movement, as too well
established for serious contest. In these circumstances, who could avoid
being immediately caught up in the little pig's plight, or avoid comparing
the misery of the incarcerated animals with the consumptive pleasures of
the over-privileged humans the next shots cut to? The filmic technique
at this point had us crossing that crucial animal/human subject boundary
with dizzying speed, so fast that our usual distancing defences did not
have time to cut in and tell us that these subjects are not at all
comparable, that humans count and pigs don't. Who could avoid
comparing the pigs' misery with the humans' pleasure, or avoid thoughts
of concentration camps and gas chambers as the pig mothers were torn
from their children and cattle-prodded into that terrible night journey
from which there was no return?
The answer, of course, to this question is: 'quite a lot of people'. Many
people didn't see animals or animal liberation as the topic of the film,
and some reviewers seemed to think it was all about how you could cross
gender and class boundaries and burst categories to make yourself
anything you wanted to be, even a sheep-pig, if you had enough
determination and willpower. For them it was a sophisticated
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postmodern-neoliberal Animal Farm allegory about personal
responsibility, individual merit rewarded, and trying harder. Babe does
have valid things to say to a human audience about not staying in the
boxes convention puts you into, but the message here is also relevant to
breaking down hierarchies of considerability which serve to confine
nonhumans. Some were open to such a metaphorical message about
stereotyping and limitation in the human case, but closed to it in the
nonhuman case. Their inability to see how animals themselves could be
more than conceptual instruments for humans and could themselves be a
topic for a 'serious' film points to their entrapment by a conceptual
framework that assigns animals a status beneath subjectivity and
seriousness. Both assignments are effective defences against hearing the
story of the speaking meat that Babe articulates. The pig Babe speaks
from the most delegitimated subject position possible in our society, that
of the meat, and we have developed strategies for blocking out and not
hearing the speech of those in that position. We could not continue the
sorts of meat practices the pig-human gulag system is based upon
without these kinds of strategies. One of the great strengths of the film is
that it invites us to challenge some of these paradoxes, blocks and
erasures.
2: The Paradox of the Speaking Meat
In the opening scenes of the factory farm we are introduced to the piglet
Babe as the film's main narrative subject (marked by the subject's theme
on the soundtrack, among other marks of subjecthood). We open with a
shot showing real piglets waking in expressive communication, and then
see one of these meat-subjects expressing his/her5 sorrow at the loss of
his mother, and his fear as he is seized by strangers and carried away to
be raffled. As his mother is prodded into the truck, Babe utters his grief
so fleetingly and naturally that we hardly notice that our usual
assumptions have been turned on their heads. The meat animal is being
presented to us as an expressive, narrative subject -- the meat is
speaking. There are several disruptions here. What is disrupted
immediately is the Cartesian stereotype of the machine-animal, the
dominant model which enables the ontological presence, mindlike and
communicative characteristics of animals to be so utterly denied in the
factory farm, where their entire lives are defined and distorted by the
function of serving human appetite. There is paradox in the concept of
speaking meat Babe confronts us with, precisely because the concept of
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meat totally erases that speaking position; there is no possibility of
encountering the meat as expressive, narrative subject.
An inquiry into the concept of meat provides a useful route into
understanding how 'taxonomy' connects ontology with ethics -- how
certain strategies of representation normalise oppression by narrowing
ethically relevant perception, erasing key ethical dimensions of
situations, and sometimes even making the other complicit in their own
oppression through internalising oppressive forms of identity. As Carol
Adams has argued6, the concept of meat justifies oppression by hiding
responsibility for death and the causal connection between the
production of meat and the animal's death. The backgrounding, erasure
or denial of these connections in the abstractly quantitative and
commodified concept of meat Adams terms 'absent referent'. 'Absent
referent' involves a complex process of splitting which renders
unavailable not only the act of killing which makes meat available as a
commodity6, but any recognition of connection between the meat and
those who consume it. To achieve this the concept of meat must
simultaneously establish several profound splits or radical exclusions,
between process-product, mind-body, and us-them. The first of these is
inherent in the commodity form and involves a radical dissociation
which denies the connection between the processes set in motion by our
intentions and the end product of commodified,
quantitativelyspecifiable flesh. The second radically dissociates the subjectivity which
sets these processes in motion from that of its victim, denying their
kinship as socially connected, purposive and communicative beings, and
presenting the victim reductively as flesh. 'You looks at us' says KingSmith's wise old sheep Maa 'and you sees lamb chops'.
The third background assumption involved in modern industrial society's
concept of meat as commodity denies the possibility of human
consumers themselves ever taking the form of meat, by a background
assumption of a hierarchy of use and considerability which is linked to
an alleged hierarchy of mental and communicative capacities between
species, with humans of course at the top. We may daily consume other
animals in their billions, but we never position ourselves reciprocally as
food for these others, not even worms. As consumers of meat who can
never suppose ourselves be meat, we assume the god-position above the
action, positioning our identity outside the framework of ecological
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exchange. The conjunction 'human meat' becomes almost as unthinkable
a possibility as the idea of being introduced to the speaking meat.
The concept of meat is a form of life7 in which taxonomy structures our
moral vision via the ethical and epistemological possibilities it discloses
or denies.8 These sets of background denials enable the presentation of
the other in the instrumental terms that Marilyn Frye has identified as
belonging to the arrogant perspective in which viewers 'organise
everything seen with reference to themselves and their own interests',9 in
this case, in terms of a strong instrumental reductionism which identifies
the other with what is only a part of their being, the part that is of use to
us as flesh. Since eurocentric culture identifies the human in radically
contrasting terms which emphasise, rather than suppress or deny we, in
contrast, are identified as humans in terms which emphasise, rather than
suppress or deny, our subjectivity, and which tend to background our
bodily aspects of identity, beings identified as meat become radically
Other: not only can we never be included in the category of meat
ourselves, we can never be introduced to the meat. These assumptions
together involve a profound and multiple denial of kinship with meat.
There is injustice in each of these denials and reductive modes of
conception. There is injustice for a communicative and ethical being in
being conceived systematically in ways that refuse recognition of this
status and these characteristics. There is injustice for such a being in
being conceived reductively as body, first because such conception
singles its referent out for treatment as radically less than it is, and
second because such an instrumental reductionism defines the other in
terms that assume the right of a 'higher' group supposedly above the
process of exchange to treat them as a resource for their ends. Animals
so conceived are subject to both radical exclusion (as having a radically
different nature discontinuous from that of the human meat consumer)
and extreme homogenisation -- replaceable and interchangeable, their
individuality submerged, they 'drown in the anonymous collectivity' of
the quantitative commodity form meat. The radical exclusion aspect of
the meat concept denies kinship and generates a conceptual distance or
boundary between humanity and its 'meat' which blocks sympathy,
reduces the risk of identification with those so designated, and silences
them as communicative beings. The reductiveness of the meat concept
permits a conceptual strategy designed to block recognition of these
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injustices, and its disruption in the concept of the speaking meat is one
source of the flavour of paradox that lingers around that idea.
But from the injustice of industrial society's institution of meat as
commodity, and the moral cowardice and evasion of the associated
conceptual strategies of denial, we cannot conclude that there is no moral
alternative to a universalised vegetarianism, that there are no other, less
ethically problematic ways to resolve the tensions between conceiving
nonhumans both as communicative others and as food. In the complex
biological exchange which sustains all our lives, we must all gain
sustenance at the expense of the other, 'the one living the other's death,
and dying the other's life', in the words of Heraclitus. Shagbark Hickory
outlines an alternative, non-reductive perspective on this exchange
which does not refuse the moral complexities and perplexities involved:
For most or all American Indians food (plant as well as
animal) is kin. Relationships to plants and animals as, on
the one hand, food and, on the other hand, kin creates a
tension which is dealt with mythically, ritually, and
ceremonially, but which is never denied. It is this refusal to
deny the dilemma in which we are
implicated in this life, a
refusal to take the way of bad faith, moral supremacy, or selfdeception which constitutes a radical
challenge
to
our
relationships to our food. The American Indian view that
considerability goes "all the way
down" requires a response
considerably more sophisticated
than those we have seen in
the West, which consist either in
drawing lines of moral
considerability in order to create an out-group, or in constructing
hierarchies of considerability creating de facto out-groups
in
10
particular cases.
As Shagbark Hickory notes, some forms of vegetarianism remain trapped
in the Western strategies of denial and radical exclusion which create
further out-groups, merely redrawing the boundary of otherness in a
different place, at the border of animality rather than humanity. This
comes about because, as we notice, the dominant Western view places
humans above the systematic exchange processes in which all creatures
become (eventually) food for others, privileging humans as eaters for
whom all others are available as food but who are never themselves
available as food. Some movements toward recognition of kinship
between humans and animals thus take the misguided form of attempting
to extend the privilege of this problematic positioning of humans above
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the exchange process outward to other (selected) groups of animals. At
the same time, such forms of recognition are of necessity highly limited
in the class to which such recognition can be extended. They can only
result in enlarging the class of the privileged, instead of a recognition of
the kinship of all living things in the biological exchanges of food, and
in a retention of the strategies of erasure and denial for the excluded
groups.
In contrast, the indigenous recognition that the central philosophical
problem of human life is that 'all our food is souls' points towards nonreductive practices and understandings of food that resolve the moral
failings of 'bad faith, moral supremacy, [and] self-deception' Shagbark
Hickory finds implicit in the dominant Western meat concept. However,
to the extent that these alternative understandings of food form part of a
different 'form of life', in Wittgenstein's sense11, they are not readily
available, either practically or conceptually, within the context of
contemporary industrial life and its commodified food relationships.
Conversely, the fact that vegetarianism may usually be the course which,
in the context of such a commodity society, will best minimise our
complicity in injustice towards others, does nothing to support the
eurocentric conclusion that vegetarianism is a universal
moral
12
requirement for all people in all societies in all situations.
In contexts where the multiple denials of kinship involved in meat
cannot be successfully made, for example in the case where we have
'been introduced' and have intimate and individual knowledge of the
particular animal to be eaten, we tend to experience powerful tensions
and often profound discomforts over its inclusion in the category of
meat. These tensions and discomforts find expression in traditional
contexts such as New Guinea, where pigs that have been raised as part of
a family are never slaughtered by that family but are exchanged.
Alternative Westerners (for example, subsistence farmers) who aim to
create 'spiritual' food practices in opposition to the dominant
commodified ones sometimes argue that meat eating is ethically
acceptable if you 'take responsibility'. This phrase I think indicates a
search for alternative food practices that avoid the processes of ethical
erasure I have identified in the practices of meat.
In a Western context of individualised ethical choice, such alternatives
would have to mean, for example, the eater taking personal responsibility
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for the eaten animal's fate (which in the case of a domestic animal would
include responsibility for the quality of its life as well as for its death),
and bearing the blame for unnecessary suffering. That would mean
finding ways to acknowledge fully the animal's 'soul' and its kinship, and
to express gratitude and reciprocity, that is, to acknowledge a reciprocal
availabiltiy as food for others. Such conditions, demanding even in the
context of traditional communities, are very difficult to realise, both
materially and psychologically, in the context of contemporary urban
Western life. To the extent that they require establishing new shared
cultural practices and meanings rather than just new individual practices,
ethically sensitive carnivorous practices are not culturally available in
that context.
The paradox of the speaking meat is both the product of a particular
social context, and an indicator of some of the most significant moral
failings of that context. The western solution to the moral dilemmas of
food is the creation of a set of moral dualisms, involving a sharp
discontinuity between those who deserve and those who are beyond
ethical consideration. As we have seen, the speaking meat forces us to
confront the way this moral dualism and discontinuity is based on
reductionism, denial and silencing. Our civilisation's orientation to the
creation of moral dualisms may be one reason for its technological
dominance, since it removes any constraints of respect which might
otherwise hold back development, but it remains an ever ready source of
corruption of our ethical practices. The silencing solutions of moral
dualism are always potentially capable of extension to selected groups
of humans counted as lesser in their humanity, and we have seen this
extension made many times in this century. Although this silencing
possibility is present in any human society, it must be greatly reinforced
by the entrenchment of the dualist model in the basic case of food.
3 : The Communicative Model
The overarching model which subsumes the commodity model of the
animal and its specific modes of and motives for reduction is the
Cartesian-mechanistic reduction of the non-human animal to its body,
and the associated refusal to recognise non-human animals as akin to
human ones in the possession of mind, intention and communication.
Mary Midgley13 and Barbara Noske14 are two philosophers who have
pointed out that the moral failings implicit in the modern, commodified
concept of meat find their philosophical progenitor in Cartesian
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rationalism and the mechanistic model. The rationalist-mechanistic
model of the animal is a key part of the relation between modernity and
the nonhuman world, and its rationality is expressed both in reductive
concepts like meat and in the practices of the factory farm.14 The
mechanistic model erases the possibility of communication by denying
mindlike properties to non-humans; ideals of manipulation and
instrumental rationality are at odds with communicative ideals and with
the conception of the other as a communicative subject. Babe confronts
us with the conflict between the mechanistic model of the factory farm,
and the communicative model of human/animal relations the film
ultimately vindicates. This alternative communicative model is located in
the film in the romantically presented contrast space of the Hoggett's
family farm, where it struggles to emerge in the unconventional role
tolerated for the former meat animal Babe and Babe's communicative
reformation of relationships with the sheep. But the farm itself is the site
of conflict between the communicative and the Cartesian-reductive
models, for it too contains the sinister meat house and the animal regimes
based on fear and force. The conflict between these models is also
represented in the form of the conflict within the taciturn farmer and
between him and the more conventional farm wife.
Nevertheless, animal liberationists have some justification for viewing
the film's major implicit contrast between the factory farm and the family
farm with a sceptical eye. To say that the family farm setting of Babe is
highly romanticised is an understatement. A cynic might say that the
family farm parallels the family as the site of mystifying representations
and idealisations. The contrasts of Babe hide the fact that the family
farm model is compatible with, and normally involves, many oppressive
animal husbandry practices; the destination of most of its animal foodproducing units is ultimately the market, and all that has changed is the
indoor setting. This would be, I think, to ignore the fact that moral
differences of degree can be important; it would be like saying that there
is no moral difference between being a worker on a production line and
an inmate of a concentration camp, because both involve some degree of
reduction and instrumentalisation. If there is a moral difference between
the smaller scale farm and the animal gulag, however, there is also
normally a lot more continuity than Babe makes visible.
But to dismiss the implicit contrast of Babe in this way would be to
miss the point that Babe also makes visible a new possibility - the
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possibility of replacing a dominant model of mechanistic relations by a
communicative one which recognises the animal's status as a
communicative and moral being and revolutionises the moral basis of
relationships with domestic animals. Whether this is compatible with
farming as we know it remains an open question, but one the film
deserves credit for raising. Babe leaves us in no doubt that meat is
violence, and it posits a model of communication in opposition to that
violence, and hence a new vision of relations to domestic animals. It
does not explore the puzzles in that vision, leaving us with various
paradoxes to chew on. But its communicative model presents a final
vision of some power, including the triumph of the communicative skills
and ethic Babe has acquired from the maternal wisdom of the sheep and
various other proxy mothers.
Babe's status as a communicative subject has received so little attention
in the monstrous regime of the gulag that he does not even have an
individual name. But, as we soon discover when Babe is removed
through the device of the raffle to the relatively enlightened world of
the family farm, Babe's status as a communicative subject still has many
obstacles to overcome to gain recognition. Before arrival at the farm,
Babe is initially just a 'worthless little runt', an object to be weighed,
raffled off and eaten. In the idealised world of the Hoggett's traditional
farm, Babe's communicative capacities are initially dimly, then more
clearly, recognised by Farmer Hoggett. But they are not initially
recognised by his wife, who addresses him as 'you lucky little pork chop'
and looks forward to Babe's transformation into the familiar commodity
form of 'two nice hams, two sides of bacon, pork chops, kidneys, liver,
chitterling, trotters etc'.
The film version of Mrs. Hoggett, unlike the book version, is made to
represent the most closed, convention and consumer-bound side of the
human character.15 Although this elaboration of conflicting perspectives
adds some richness to the film's themes and characterisation, the linking
of the conflict between the mechanistic and communicative perspectives
in this way with gender introduces elements of androcentrism into the
story, obscures the real connections between gender and consumerism
and between gender and the mechanistic model,16 and generates
contradictory messages about the affirmation of animality. This emerges
in the film's derogatory representation of the farm wife in animalistic
terms and in the implicit demeaning of women's understanding and tasks
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as consumeristic and materialistic, in contrast to the more 'spiritual'
orientation of the father/farmer. Babe's subjectivity is recognised by
several animal foster mothers, the dog Fly and the sheep Maa, who
develop Babe's communicative and social abilities in the best maternal
traditions. But although Babe's unusual communicative abilities must
ultimately derive from these various mothers (who must have included
the original pig mother he missed so much), it is their completion and
recognition by the father/farmer, represented as the 'unprejudiced heart',
that are positioned in the movie as the key transformative elements for
Babe and for the culture more generally.
The farmer is, for reasons the film leaves unexplored, open to certain
possibilities of animal communication the others around him are closed
to. By various communicative deeds, Babe gradually earns the farmer's
recognition of his subjectivity, or so he believes, but is devastated by the
final -- incredible -- discovery of his status as meat, revealed to him by
the jealous cat. This apparent betrayal, (of almost biblical proportions)
by the father, almost kills Babe, who, like the duck Ferdie, cannot bear to
live as only meat. At this point in the story, as at the beginning and the
end, Babe is positioned as a Christ figure, the feminised, dependent son
who is affirmed and revived by the farmer/father's recognition and love,
expressed in the dance of life. Together Babe and the farmer go on to
accomplish the apparently impossible feat of opening closed minds and
demonstrating Babe's unrecognised communicative ability to the world.
We are invited to conclude that this revolutionises the treatment of pigs
and of farming generally, reformulating it as an activity based on
communication rather than force and violence. The communicative ethic
is also strongly represented by the (female) sheep, whose persistent faith
in and exemplification of the virtues and values of communication and
non-violence is essential to their ultimate victory over the reductive
violence of traditional relationships.
Communicative relationships open up new moral possibilities for
organising life in ways that can negotiate conflicts of interests, build
agreement, trust and mutuality, and avoid instrumentalism and the
imposition of the will of one party on the other by force. Communicative
relations don't necessarily follow out those possibilities however, and it
is important not to romanticise the communicative model, which does
not automatically eliminate the dynamic of power, either in terms of
equality of access, of hierarchy in forms of communication, or of the
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structuring of communication in hegemonic ways. There are various
strategies for taking back the greater equality communicative models
appear to offer. Rationalist models which treat communication as an
exercise in pure, abstract, neutral and universal reason, and which
delegitimate the more emotional and bodily forms and aspects of
communication, operate to exclude nonhumans from full communicative
status just as they exclude various human others accorded lower human
status as further from the rational ideal. These rationalist models exclude
the forms of communication associated with animals along with the
forms of communication associated with women, with non-western
cultures and with less 'educated' classes.17
Communicative models which allow us to overcome these exclusions for
humans will also help us to recognise non-human animals in their denied
aspects as communicative beings, but an excessive emphasis on
communication and its use as a criterion of moral worth or value would
remain problematic for nonhumans in basing itself on a capacity which
may still be highly characteristic of humanity, and in biasing our
valuations heavily towards those species most similar to ourselves. To
overcome this implicit anthrocentrism, a communicative model would
need to be part of plural set of grounds for valuation, rather than its
unique and exclusive basis, and to be sensitive to communicative
capacities within species as well as to their capacities for communication
with humans.
If the film's communicative vision offers hope of moving on to a new
stage beyond mechanism, it also leaves us with many tantalising
questions about this new stage which arise from the ambivalence of
communication. Will communication be on our terms or theirs? Will
Babe's communicative abilities be used for the good of the animals or
for that of the farmer? If the film's account of the moral development of
the farmer (reaching its climax in the step-dance) offers a vision of the
small farm as a putative future enterprise of love and communication
with nature and animals, the film also casts little light on the question of
what the communicative farm would be like. Will the new
communicative paradigm be used to liberate the sheep and the other farm
animals, or merely to oppress them in more subtle and self-complicit
ways? Will the communicative animal farm stand to the mechanistic
farm as the hegemonic communicative forms of liberal democracy stand
to the more repressive forms of patriarchal-authoritarian governance
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they replaced? The distinction between democracy and despotism is
supposedly built on such a contrast, but as it becomes increasingly clear
how little our own society resembles the democratic ideal of free and
open dialogue to which all have access, it also becomes clear how our
communicative abilities can be used to control and imprison us. A new
communicative stage of human-nature relationships would need to place
such questions at the centre of its critical thought: at this level, the tale of
the speaking meat has only just begun.
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AN INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR PETER SINGER

Denise Russell: Professor Singer, I would like to begin with a question
concerning ethical issues in relation to animals. What difference do you
see from twenty years ago?
Peter Singer: I think the big difference is that there is no question now
that animals are a significant ethical issue. They are part of the agenda of
any debate about the nature of ethics and the reach of ethical concerns, or
in other words: how far do our ethical concerns extend? When I first
became interested in these issues, towards the end of 1970, they were
really completely new issues. It was very hard to find any on-going
discussion about ethics and animals. There was really no one writing
about it, although there were many works of philosophy being written
where you can see, looking at it now, that they just basically overlooked
the problem. I mean, for example, accounts of the nature of equality
which explain equality by saying all humans are equal because all
humans have interests, in that they can all suffer or enjoy life and this is
a basic human right, etc. etc. Then the rest of the argument goes on,
entirely about humans and this is supposed to be a basis for human
equality. Obviously the criterion for equality just given includes nonhuman animals as well as humans and that would seem to imply by the
nature of the argument that animals are in some way equal as well. Yet
the author does not even pause to say why animals are not included
because the question does not even occur to him. There were quite a few
articles being written around that time like that. There were also one or
two rather peripheral articles that did raise the question of animals but
usually in order to dismiss it with some fairly rhetorical expression like:
'Of course they lack the intrinsic dignity that humans have' or 'Animals
are not ends in themselves. They don't have intrinsic worth.' So there
was no serious discussion at the beginning of the 1970's about this issue.
And that has completely changed. Clearly it is an issue that is on the
philosophical agenda and it is on political and social agendas as well.
You only have to open up any text book of applied ethics or
contemporary moral issues and you are pretty sure to find some
discussion about the moral status of animals or our ethical obligations to
animals.
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Denise Russell: Another question I wanted to ask has to do with animal
rights. I think in this area that talk about rights has some rhetorical force
but a rights position is difficult to defend. In your early work you did talk
a little about rights and then you had that paper in the mid-eighties where
you tried to distance yourself from Regan's position on animal rights. I
wonder what your position is now. Do you think that it is useful to talk
in terms of animal rights or would you prefer to stay with a more strictly
utilitarian perspective?
Peter Singer: I think my view has always been that the grounding for
ethical consideration in relation to animals is in terms of their capacity to
feel, and in terms of the wrongness of inflicting pain on beings
irrespective of their species. I don't think my view has ever been one
that was really grounded in terms of rights. It is true, as you say, that in
the first edition of Animal Liberation I talked about animals having a
right to equal consideration of their interests, and the differentiation that
I drew later on was merely because I felt that this had been
misinterpreted into the view that I was defending an animal rights
position, by which I mean that the grounding of the whole position is
based on some claim about rights. I never thought that that was really
very helpful. So I think the position I hold now is still essentially that,
i.e. that the grounding is not in terms of rights but on the other hand that
rights may be useful as a kind of short-hand, particularly in the political
arena, where so much of these discussions is couched in terms of rights
that you have to quite deliberately avoid the language of rights. That
somehow marks you out from other issues where people will debate
about whether the foetus has a right to life, species have a right to exist
and so on. So I am certainly prepared to use the term 'rights' in that
political context, not so much as a philosopher, but more as a
campaigner. More recently in The Great Ape Project we actually start
the book with a declaration on behalf of the great apes which claims that
they have three basic rights, namely the rights to life, liberty and
protection from torture; but that is quite clearly being used as a statement
in the political domain, not as a philosophical grounding. The point of
this is simply that we are always talking about rights for humans - we
have got the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and so on.
We are trying quite deliberately to put the rights of the non-human great
apes there alongside those of humans.
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Denise Russell: When you use rights talk for political purposes, what do
you do when you are confronted with people who mention the issue of
conflicting rights? Say if you are talking about moral vegetarianism and
somebody says, what about the human right to eat animals?
Peter Singer: Well at that point I think you have to stop just using
'rights' as a political slogan and you have to ask what is the basis for
what we are talking about, and then you have to say, well really what we
want is equal consideration of interests. We have to consider the interests
of humans in eating and the interests of animals in not being made to
suffer and so on. And of course if the humans can't survive without
eating animals then there is a real clash, a real conflict of interests. If on
the other hand what we are talking about is whether humans will
continue to eat pork rather than tofu, when they can be nourished just as
well or better by the tofu, then it is a less serious clash. So I do think you
have to get away from the rights language at this point otherwise you just
get a swapping of intuitions: 'Well I think I have a right to eat'; 'No, I
think animals have a right to life' and that doesn't get any further.
Denise Russell: Yes. On the Great Ape Project, would you like to bring
us up to date with what is happening with that?
Peter Singer: Yes. The Great Ape Project now has co-ordinators in a
number of different countries, in the United States, in England, in
Germany, in Sweden, in Finland, in Taiwan, in New Zealand and other
places as well, and we are working on different levels simultaneously.
On the one hand we are just trying to raise the general awareness of the
issue of why we demarcate ourselves from apes. The whole point of the
project is to use the animals who are most like us, and who are best
studied and about whom we know most in terms of their self-awareness
and their capacities, as a kind of bridge to narrow the gulf between
humans and animals and to say, look, we can't classify the animal
kingdom into humans and animals. There are beings who are very like
us, and there are beings who are less like us, and you have got to look at
them differently. The Great Ape Project is a way of asking what is it that
is so special about being human? There is clearly a great overlap
between the capacities of the other great apes and our own. On one level
we are trying to raise consciousness about that issue and on another level
we are working to try to change the law wherever that is possible. So we
are having on-going discussions with lawyers concerned about animal
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rights issues in a number of different countries about possibilities for
bringing lawsuits, the purpose of which would be to have animals, or
particularly say a chimpanzee, declared to be a being with a legal
standing of its own rather than a thing; in other words, we want apes to
be, not property but beings who have rights in themselves. So that is
another level, the legal level. And then we have also been working quite
specifically where we have seen opportunities for particular apes. In the
talk tonight I'll be showing a video about one particular ape that was in a
laboratory and who we managed to get out.
Denise Russell: Could you say a little bit more about the lawsuits? Are
these designed just with the aim of trying to get apes recognized as
beings in their own right and not property?
Peter Singer: Yes, that is the basic idea of it, to take that kind of step,
that kind of breakthrough. Obviously ideally we would like them to be
declared legal persons with the same basic rights that humans have.
Denise Russell: Are you familiar with the case which was argued in
connection with the dolphins who Herman and his research team were
studying?
Peter Singer: Yes, the Hawaii case.
Denise Russell: The people who took the dolphins and released them
were trying to put the argument that the dolphins shouldn't be regarded
as property but as persons.
Peter Singer: Yes, in a sense that is the kind of case we are running.
We think that that case was perhaps run prematurely. There wasn't either
the climate or the preparations for it and I don't think that dolphins are
the ideal species either because there isn't really enough established
about dolphins in the same way that there is about chimpanzees for
example. But yes, we would like to run a case like that which had a
better chance of success.
Denise Russell: Does it have to be property or persons. Is there any other
way of arguing this within Western laws?
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Peter Singer: There is a possibility for some sort of intermediate status,
if that is what you mean and there have been some American and some
European decisions suggesting that animals may have a kind of
intermediate status. Here is an example at a very crude level: normally, if
a garage takes your car and negligently does something which means that
your car is written off, what you get back is the market value of the car.
In the past there were cases in which a vet or someone else did that to a
cat, and all that the owner got back was the market value of the cat. Now
recently there have been cases in which it was held that the owner would
be held entitled to loss and suffering in some way analogous to that
which one might have for a member of the family. So it is not the market
value of the property, or the cost of replacing it anymore. This is a tiny
incremental breakthrough in the idea that animals are not just property,
but obviously we don't feel that that goes nearly far enough.
Denise Russell: I thought on reading the case about the dolphins that
having to argue that they were persons might have been a very difficult
argument to run, given the prevalent attitudes. If the lawyers had tried to
argue that they shouldn't be regarded as property even though they are
not persons then perhaps they might have had more success. I was just
wondering about the legal technicalities here.
Peter Singer: I think the law has been a bit dichotomous. It has divided
things into property and persons and there are just now these suggestions
of a kind of half-way status but I suppose people were not very clear
about it - in the dolphin case people were probably not clear that there
was that possibility.
Denise Russell: One other question that I wanted to ask you was about
the dispute that sometimes crops up between people who are looking at
the interests of animals and people who see themselves as looking at the
interests of the environment more broadly. I was wondering whether you
had any thoughts on that sort of debate and the point that some people in
the environment movement suggest that those who have a strong interest
in the welfare of animals are really operating from a liberal humanist
perspective and are limited because of that.
Peter Singer: Yes, there is clearly a sense in which the views that I
hold, although they are quite radical in their implications for how we
should change our relationships with animals, are also relatively
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conventional in the way they derive from an easily recognisable western
philosophical tradition - you could call it liberal-humanist or you could
call it utilitarian. There is nothing radically different or new about it. I
see that as its strength, in that it means that it is something that you can
really use to argue with I see that as its strength, in that it means that it is
something that you can really use to argue with people who are also in
that tradition - and most people in our society are - and within their own
terms you can convince them that the views that they hold are
inconsistent, or more broadly incoherent, or make arbitrary distinctions
that can't be defended. If on the other hand you switch to a kind of
ecological holistic perspective you really detach yourself from all those
traditions and it is much harder for you to bring your view into a sharp
confrontation with the views that most people hold. It's almost, and this
is a bit of a parody, like saying what people used to say in the '60's,
unless you drop acid and turn on you won't be able to see what I am
talking about. Most people are not going to do that so the question is
how that kind of argument is really going to be made to work. I guess
that is the problem for me too. I'd like to really understand how we can
defend the interests of the ecology as a whole and for its own sake. I
have no difficulty with arguments for preserving an ecosystem that are
based on the interests of sentient beings. For example, we can claim that
the preservation of a wetlands is vitally important because without it
thousands of birds, frogs and other sentient beings will die. But what if
there were no sentient beings who would be any worse off if a particular
local ecosystem perished? Can we still find good arguments to say that it
would be wrong to cause the ecosystem to perish? What would those
arguments be like? This is a genuine question: I am not saying that there
are no such arguments, I am asking for an account of what they might be
based on.
Denise Russell: Where does that leave you in thinking about the
environment as a whole?
Peter Singer: I don't think that in any way it makes it difficult for me to
argue that it is very important to defend the integrity of ecological
systems. But the way I would do so is not by saying that ecosystems have
intrinsic rights. Still less would it be by personifying ecosystems and
treating them as agents or conscious beings or something of that sort. It
would rather be by saying, look if you cut down the forests you destroy
the habitat of many thousands of sentient beings and they will suffer and
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die. You foreclose the possibilities of aesthetic and recreational
appreciation by humans. You risk polluting the rivers and causing
erosion and climatic change and so on. I would use all of those
arguments. I wouldn't say that the forest as such has a right to remain.
Denise Russell: So it would be the instrumental value in this instance?
Peter Singer: Yes, for me sentient beings have intrinsic value. Anything
that is not a sentient being can only have instrumental value; but it may
have very great instrumental value of course.
Denise Russell: How far do you currently think the range of sentient
beings extends with your understanding of the empirical work and so on?
Peter Singer: Well I have a grey area on that and I guess that it's
inevitable that one will. I think that vertebrates are clearly sentient. I
think that crustacea are very probably sentient. I think that some
molluscs such as the octopus is no doubt sentient but I'm doubtful
whether simpler molluscs such as oysters are sentient. I'm not saying
definitely that they are not, but I'm doubtful. I noticed that David de
Grazia goes into this in his recent book Taking Animals Seriously, and he
offers some argument that insects may not be sentient. I think that is still
a grey area too but you would have to say it would be a source of relief if
one could reasonably believe that insects are not sentient, particularly for
anyone living in Australia!
Denise Russell: Especially cockroaches.
Peter Singer: I was thinking of especially mosquitos and ants. I can live
without going around killing cows or pigs or birds, but to go around
without killing ants is not easy.
Denise Russell: No, unless you are a Jainist (who sweep ants from their
path) - but even the sweeping may kill. Just finally, and maybe you don't
want to answer this, what do you see in the contemporary times as the
key ethical problem in relation to animals? Do you think it is the fact that
we continue to experiment on them, or that we continue to eat them or
put them in zoos?

44

Peter Singer: I think that the food issue is fundamental for two reasons.
One is that simply in terms of the numbers of animals used, the amount
of sheer misery that we inflict on animals is vastly greater in farming
than it is in experimentation. You just have to look at the numbers. In
experimentation worldwide you might be talking about 100 or 200
million animals at the most, but there are five billion chickens produced
in the United States alone every year. So the numbers are just
enormously greater and the suffering - though you might not be able to
see it in quite such vivid terms as when you read a description of a
scientific experiment - can be very extreme and also very prolonged.
The other reason why the food issue is fundamental is that it helps to
form our attitudes to animals. We don't grow up experimenting on
animals. We do grow up eating animals and I think that has a marked
effect on the attitudes that we take to animals afterwards. It makes us
think of animals as objects for our use, rather than beings with lives of
their own, and that is where all the problems start.
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SCIENCE AND ANIMALS - OR, WHY CYRIL WON'T WIN THE
NOVEL PRIZE
Lynda Birke

In loving memory of Tess, a wilful and feisty cairn
terrier, who was killed on the road the week before I began to
write, and of Ginny, a loving lurcher whose sudden death shortly
after deprived the world of beauty.

Prologue
There have always been animals in my life. I have long had a love affair
with horses; dogs, too, feature strongly in my emotions and in my house.
And not only companion animals, but also the wild creatures that
surround us all. Even in London, in the postwar devastation I witnessed
while growing up, I learned the joy of watching the birds in the trees.
In what sometimes seems another life, I trained as a scientist.
Ambivalent though I was about doing biology (surely I could not bear
the thought of cutting up dead animals?), I ended up studying just that.
For years, I agonized over the fate of animals in the laboratories, and my
own role as a student of biology in that fate. Here, I want to tell
something of my own story - how I survived doing science, but how my
relationships with animals finally persuaded me that science was too
disrespectful.
If now I can speak of these things, it is partly because I no longer work
in the laboratories. Courage to speak is always easier for those on the
outside. But it is also partly born of my feminism, which has
encouraged me to ask questions that are troubling - even about the
science that I was doing. Silence helps no one.
Becoming a scientist
Becoming a scientist - like any other professional training - is a gradual
process of learning: students must learn not only facts, but also how
scientists behave. Much of this is gained informally, at coffee and
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conferences. Gradually, you learn how to look at the world through
scientists' eyes, how to ask "scientific" questions, and what counts as
scientific knowledge and what does not.
Submerged in all this learning are two critical distinctions. One is that
knowledge only 'counts' if it is gained through scientific method; thus,
the knowledge of people who live or work with animals does not count.
The second is that there are (at least) two kinds of animals. Scientists,
like anyone else, might have very personalized relationships with
companion animals at home. Yet, in the laboratory, the 'lab animal'
becomes a tool of the trade, a sensitive piece of apparatus.
In telling my own story now I realize that I had to live with these two
contradictions. I acknowledged both ways of knowing, and I accepted
two quite different ways of being with animals. Yet despite these
overwhelming dilemmas, there were also good reasons to learn science.
One is that I was fascinated by it, by natural history and especially by
animals.The budding eight-year-old, pony-mad scientist learned to recite
the Latin names of every single bone in the vertebrate skeleton provided it had an equine form around it. Moreover, no one in my family
thought that girls could not do science; on the contrary, I was given
chemistry sets and learned to build radios.
I had moreover long been drawn to natural history; surely I thought,
science would enable me to study animals and plants in detail. Yet I was
ambivalent about doing biology precisely because of the need to do
things to animals. Twice over in my early training, I tried to concentrate
on the physical sciences: but always something drew me back to biology.
The fascination with the living world won out, even though I had to steel
myself against the need to do dissections - or worse. I often wonder,
when I hear people express concern about the need for people to
understand more science, how many have been put off it for life by
having to cut into animal flesh.
Thirty years later, I can still feel vividly that sense of horror at school as
I was confronted with a white rabbit with pink ears, for dissection. I said
nothing: you were simply expected to get on with it. Even by age 17, I
had been socialized not to show emotion; I did after all, want to do
science. Alongside the sense of revulsion however was another emotion,
a sense of fascination at the beauty of (once) living tissues, at how they
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are put together. For all that I think dissection is unnecessary in
biological education, it seems important to say that seeing 'what the
animal was made of' did have an impact.
So while I hated the very idea of picking out the frog that was to be
killed (which I handed to a friend to kill, rather than bear doing it
myself), there was a profound sense of awe as we stood together gazing
at the iridescent skin, the slowly moving red blood cells, through the
microscope. I cannot ever justify that animal's death; but I do know that
the awe stayed with me, making me feel even more strongly just how
beautiful animals are.
Yet whatever one's aesthetic reaction, scientific training soon makes the
student learn to suppress emotions. Slowly, you need to learn not to
show questioning reactions to the use of animals, living or dead. Insofar
as aesthetic or emotional reactions are encouraged in scientific training,
these are likely to be responses to what nature has become after the
processes of science. Scientists might for instance, express pleasure or
even excitement at the colours or the orderliness of cells in a photograph
taken with an electron microscope, just as I felt a kind of fascinated
pleasure at the colours and textures of the tissues from the animal I had
to dissect. But expressing anxiety about the sufferings of living animals
in laboratories comes suspiciously close to the rhetoric of animal rights
and would only be discouraged.
Budding scientists must learn to deny such feelings of empathy. Indeed,
those feelings are considered 'unmanly' as the entomologist Miriam
Rothschild once noted in a lecture. Whatever else it involves, becoming
a scientist entails learning to acquire, or fit into, the macho culture of the
laboratory and forswearing such 'feminine' responses as empathy with
the animals. In that sense, the suppression of empathy or other emotions
in scientific training is a gendered experience.
With all these contradictions and dilemmas in the background, I began a
research career with some unease. Somehow I ended up doing animal
behaviour research which at least allowed me to study what animals do
and is perhaps less disrespectful than many other areas of biology.
Despite all my turbulent feelings about animals and nature however I had
been sufficiently desensitized to toe the line:
ambivalence
notwithstanding, I did laboratory-based research - for a while.
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Yet alongside that I was also involved in both the Women's Movement
and in environmental activism. Out of those politics, I questioned more
and more what science was all about: what kinds of issues, for instance,
influence how science is done. To begin with I continued with research
justifying it to myself as long as nothing too nasty was done to the
animals and they were well cared for. Much of my research was
motivated by feminist questions - issues to do with women and health for
example - for which at that time I was prepared to swallow my
conscience and use animals as 'models' for humans. Only later did I
explicitly question the use of animals altogether, and the fact that
keeping them in laboratories must inevitably mean their exploitation and
subsequent deaths.
It seems to me that it is an abuse of animals, not respect, (let alone the
economic considerations) that allows large numbers of animals to be
bred only to be wasted. Animals are killed routinely in laboratories.
Some are 'sacrificed' in the course of an experiment; many more are
killed simply because no one uses them on time or because scientists
from one laboratory in the building don't particularly talk to those in
another. The result is that in different laboratories, animals are killed for
different parts of their bodies, when laboratories could co-operate and
thus save lives. I find it odd that the numbers of animals killed because
they are not 'needed' for experiments seems to merit far less attention
from animal rights activists than the animals killed during particular
experimental procedures.
Where individuals in the laboratory start to be respected as individuals
by humans is where they pass over the boundaries from the world of
'data' to becoming a pet. Researchers working with animals sometimes
designate particular animals as pets, so removing them from the realms
of potential experimental animals. Naming the individual is one way of
doing this; it is much harder to do something nasty to a Rita than to a
numbered rat.
I can well recall the occasional animal that passed through our hands that
would become special 'like a pet' - whose death we would mourn in a
way that we did not mourn for all of the other animals, who remained
numbers in cages. Cyril, for example, was a white rat whose front teeth
did not meet properly in the middle. Rather than 'cull' him (lab-speak for
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killing), we removed him from the experimental cages and kept him as a
pet, clipping his teeth into shape regularly so that he could eat.
Still, those concerns about killing did not for a long while actually stop
me from doing science. I knew that animals were going to have to be
killed. I knew that some of the procedures I might have to use were
somewhat invasive. Yet I swallowed my feelings about those for many
years - such is the power of the desensitization that comes through
scientific training.
Ironically, I was a vegetarian all this time. Eating animals was to me
unethical, even unthinkable, and I did not want to be part of it. Yet there
are many parallels between the meat industry and the breeding and
maintenance of animals in laboratories. Large numbers are bred in order
to be killed in both cases, and wastage is considerable. In both
industries, too, animals must be killed (sacrificed?) deliberately: an
animal that ups and dies on its own cannot count either as data or as a
meal.
Meanwhile, in the lab I dissociated myself. To be a scientist in the lab
meant having two, quite different, relationships to animals. My
experience of those animals with whom I lived and played was so much
at odds with my experience of animals in the laboratory. In lab work, you
end up treating animals in groups. Animal 39/2/F is just a number in a
cage. She represents a group or a treatment or a species, but you know
nothing about her own history, about her life with her companions.
For all that I was fascinated by science (and still am), doing it has meant
for me a sense of alienation, sometimes as a woman in a (still) largely
male world, and more often as someone who cares deeply about
animals. Cyril was lucky; his difference allowed him to become special.
Most of the many millions of animals that pass through the world's
laboratories each day are not.
It is distressing to be in a lab around people who are being cavalier with
animals. There is a disrespect in the way some people handle the animals
they use - not many people, perhaps, but enough. The animals often seem
to be tools, means to an end (and certainly become so when reduced to
numbers in the scientific report). Perhaps people don't mean to be cruel but stunning a rat by swinging it round by the tail while cracking jokes is
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hardly a sign of respect. On the other hand, I don't know that anyone who
wants to stun a rat would be able to behave in any other way. Is it
possible to have respect for the animal you are about to stun and
decapitate? Cracking jokes may be a way of coping with doing
something that, in other contexts, would be considered quite horrible. It
is, if you like, a way of giving the act a different name.
Naming nature: making scientific stories
Science is, ostensibly, about discovering how the world works; it is
meant to be the pursuit of truth and proof. Maybe so, but it is also - as
many critics have pointed out - deeply imbued with the values of the
wider society. So its twin tasks of naming and describing nature are not
innocent. How animals are described in scientific texts and natural
history programmes on television have considerable impact on how we
collectively
think about them.
That process helps to ensure that we continue to see non-human animals
as inferior to humans. Indeed, it is only quite recently that there has been
much scientific interest at all in the question of 'animal minds' or animal
consciousness. In my training, we were strongly discouraged from the
sin of 'anthropomorphism' - attributing human feelings to animals. What
that means is that you can talk at home about how much Rover
understands, but woe betide you if you even think about what Cyril is
feeling in the lab. The result, inevitably, is that scientists learn doublespeak. Perhaps we might get away with jokey references to animal
feeling or thought in the experiments: but then you must go away and
write that arcane language of scientific articles that denies any feelings at
all.
There are perhaps unsurprisingly many attempts to refute any evidence
that shows animals to be clever.There is too much invested, both
scientifically and culturally, in the notion of animal irrationality and
inability. Culturally, we in the West have come to want to separate
ourselves from nature, to shore up the boundaries between clever
humans and those furry, feathered and finned 'others' who are not human.
The more easily that they become 'others' the more easily we can treat
them with disrespect - whether they are other humans or other species.
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That is why many scientists can accept working with rats and mice, but
would find it difficult to work with primates: they are too like us. I am
also reminded of an anecdote about a scientist who felt that it was easier
for him to use greyhounds than other dogs, because they did not 'look at
you in the same way'. I shuddered when I heard that story, and thought of
my beautiful lurchers (relatives of greyhounds); Ginny was not 'other',
but part of my life and I of hers.
Even if scientists begin to study animal minds, there remains the problem
of how to interpret research findings. Humans are rather too good at
disparaging what an animal does, especially if it fails to perform a task in
the way that we would do it, and on our terms. Many books recount the
tale of the horse 'Clever Hans', who allegedly could count. When it
turned out that Hans was responding to his owner's unconscious cues, his
abilities were discounted. But to me that is still pretty clever; I would not
use the story to dismiss his abilities, merely because he did not seem to
'count' the way we do. I doubt that I could spot those subliminal cues to
which Hans responded.
Those who train animals might well wonder why it has taken science so
long to catch up with what they have long known about animal thinking.
They might sometimes adopt the languages of science - talking
behaviouristically of conditioning, for example - while simultaneously
believing in the animal's abilities to form complex concepts. Admittedly,
the kinds of animals that we train in depth are nearly always mammals or
birds; hence, we know relatively little about the concept formation of
other kinds of animals.
There is a strong belief that animals are simply not as smart as we are.
Yet interpreting 'stupidity' is not easy, even among ourselves. In looking
at 'animal consciousness', Radner and Radner note the case of a species
of bee that was fooled by experimenters into repeating a particular
behaviour pattern over and over again1 (the bees respond to the odour of
oleic acid, indicating to them that there is a dead bee in the hive that
should be removed. The experimenters daubed oleic acid onto a live bee,
and found that the bees repeatedly tried to remove it). Now, the
behaviour can be thought of as illustrative of bee stupidity. But why are
we so sure that they are simply being stupid?
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We ourselves cannot always recognize death, the Radners note, even
with the aid of high-tech medical apparatus. And we make allowances
for humans to be credulous or gullible even when they persist in
irrational beliefs, while 'animals...are expected to be perfect little
scientists. In order to earn the epithet "conscious" they must be proficient
in logic, ever ready to change their beliefs in the face of available
evidence, careful to take all considerations into account. When people
fail to live up to this idea, we say they are all too human. When animals
fail, they are said to be machine-like'.
There is an issue moreover about the conditions in which the animals are
tested by humans, as well as those in which they live. The animals used
in such tests are usually kept in relatively impoverished conditions, and
given tests that may not be particularly appropriate for their species. Yet
scientists can still conclude lesser intelligence! Even humans would
come out pretty stupid if given tests of their ability to find their way by
smell, or if they had spent their life living in a space the size of a small
bathroom.
Shoring up the intellectual boundaries between us and other animals
seems to be something of a cultural preoccupation, a protection against
great anxiety. In a preface to a short story, Ursula Le Guin reflects on
this, noting that
Some linguists deny the capacity of apes to talk in quite the
same spirit in which their intellectual forbears denied the
capacity of women to think. If these great men are
threatened by Koko the gorilla speaking a little [sign
language], how would they feel reading a lab report written
by a rat?2
How indeed.
Living socially: humans and other animals
Perhaps it does not matter that science makes these claims that animals
are qualitatively different from us. Yet the very same science also
expects to work on the assumption that non-human animals are
sufficiently similar to us that we can justifiably use them as 'models' for
us in experiments. Surely there is a contradiction here?
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Part of the reason why scientists can live with this contradiction is
precisely the reliance on data from groups or species (unless, ironically,
it is intelligence itself which is studied: then individuals may well be the
focus of attention). But when animals come in numbered lots (like rats in
stacked cages) it is much easier to ignore their idiosyncrasies. It is also
easier to ignore their status as sentient animals and to behave as though
they are merely tools of the laboratory. I well remember the technicians
in one laboratory I visited telling me that they had to swap the rats from
clear plastic cages to opaque ones. The reason, they said, was that the
scientists were disturbed 'because the rats would come and look at you'.
Looking with interest at the humans outside is something a sentient
animal might do: test tubes do not.
By contrast to the numbered lots of rats in the lab, I knew all the animals
at home, my horses or dogs, as individuals; I worked with them and
knew their idiosyncrasies. I trained the horses daily and began to
understand their individuality. Scientific accounts based on such
individual stories would be considered insufficient for any
generalizations about the species, horse. Yet after many years of working
with horses, I have a strong suspicion that I know that species far, far
better (and thus in a way that is more predictive of its behaviour) than I
know any of the species that I worked with in the laboratory. Yet isn't
science supposed to be about its ability to make predictions about the
natural world?
What I have learned from companions at home is how intelligent they
are, what love they have to give, how beautiful their movements are and
about their different personalities. I learn too how patient they are in
trying to get us to understand what they have to say - and how often we
fail. Science could never teach these things.
Still the laboratory work had its own value in the development of my
own thinking about our relationship to animals and what that means. It
was through working with rats, for example, that I came to appreciate
better what fine animals they are. I know full well the cultural loathing of
these animals which is played on by organisations defending animal use
in science as they point to the fact that most experiments are done on rats
and mice. Thus the British Research Defence Society points out to the
public that some 85 per cent of experiments are done on these creatures as though that somehow makes them more acceptable. People who have
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not had such relatively privileged lives as I have had may of course have
good reason to hate or fear them. Rats there are aplenty in the stables but
I have none infesting my house, and I cannot imagine what it must be
like to have them nibble my toes in my sleep. Cultural antipathy to rats
certainly has some grounding in the history of disease: yet it is also
loaded with myth, just as stories about the 'fearsomeness' of wolves
abound. As I watched them and worked with them so I grew to like
them, those little white rats with pink eyes (like Cyril) or the black and
white ones with sparkling dark eyes. I learned to appreciate their
curiosity and watchfulness, their playfulness, and their obvious
intelligence in spite of their impoverished lives in laboratory cages.
Every day that I entered the lab, I spoke to the rats - 'Hi, everyone!'. I
enjoyed their company. And every day my unease grew. To begin with, I
simply changed procedures, so that the animals were interfered with as
little as possible. But then one day I walked in and lifted the little wiremesh trap door of a cage as it sat on the floor. In the cage were a group
of young sisters, black and white adolescent rats. Curious, they all came
to the gap in their ceiling, putting their tiny paws onto the edge of the
wire, their bright black eyes sparkling and their whiskers whisking. I
looked at their paws, like miniature hands, at their glossy coats in
different patterns, and I marvelled at their inquisitiveness. I knew then
that I had had enough.
Ironically, I think that the work I do now has more to do with science, in
the sense that it is deeply motivated by my love of the natural world and
of animals. I continue to think, teach and write about 'how we think
about animals'. I did that as a working scientist, too: but now, I am
willing to range more widely, not to restrict myself. In that venture, I am
reminded of what philosopher Sandra Harding has said of science - that,
despite its pretences at objectivity, it cannot be strongly objective unless
it takes proper account of the 'missing voices'. For her, that includes all
kinds of human 'others' marginalized from science.3 For me, that must
also include non-humans.
Living with animals has made me sensitive to the complex ways in
which they and we become integrated into a social relationship.
Domestic horses, for instance, are not just 'broken', as the saying goes.
Rather, they are usually assimilated into relationships with us (and us
with them) from the day they are born. So too are domestic dogs. Yet
science has almost nothing to say about the emergence of relationships
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between humans and non-humans, or about the ways in which particular
kinds of animal enter human society. To be sure, we can read about the
'instincts of the dog' derived from its wolf ancestors, and about how
these predispose dogs to behave socially in certain ways. But where are
the studies of how dogs become socialized into human ways? Or even us
into theirs?
I have often wondered what science might look like if, instead of having
animals in numbered lots, they were treated respectfully as individuals.
Now my work includes thinking about what science might have become,
had its history been different, had it not relied on distancing ourselves
from nature. What stories would scientists tell if they spent their days
with Cyril instead of cages 34- 40? How would their tales change if they
had watched Tess, or Ginny, instead of watching machines printing out
data from beagles? They could no longer pretend to be distancing
themselves from nature; rather, they would have to listen. They might
even find that Cyril, or Ginny and Tess, had rather a lot to say, about life,
the universe, and even humans.
But can we listen?
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1. D. Radner and M. Radner, Animal Consciousness (Prometheus, New
York, 1989), pp. 180-1.
2. Ursula LeGuin, 'The author of the Acadia Seeds', in Buffalo Gals and
Other Presences (Capra Press, Santa Barbara, 1987), p.157.
3. S. Harding, Whose science? Whose Knowledge? (Open University
Press, Milton Keynes, 1991)
Biography
Lynda Birke is a biologist and feminist who teaches in the Centre for the
Study of Women and Gender at the University of Warwick, England. Her
work focuses particularly on feminist studies of science; her published
work includes Women, feminism and biology (1986), Tomorrow's Child
(1990; with two others), Feminism, Animals and Science (1994) and
Reinventing Biology (1995, edited with Ruth Hubbard).

56

SPECIESISM AND SEXISM
Emma Munro

On a global scale the most exploited humans are women and in factory
farming the most exploited animals are female. Women are severely
exploited through the non-recognition of unpaid subsistence activities
and home-maker services as ‘real work’. By ‘real work’ I mean a fiscally
responsive operation, within current Western economic systems.
Consequently, as Marilyn Waring argues, this 'hidden economy' means
that women are under-counted in the labour forces and their
contributions are not recognised in national accounts.1
Similarly, female animals are over-exploited on the basis of their sex.2
According to Gruen, the egg industry is indicative of abusively
exploitative farming practices. Egg factory farming generates
approximately 4.2 billion, that is 95% of all eggs in the United States
every year. De-beaked hens are confined for 12 to 18 months in wire
mesh cages, without room to move around, stretch their wings, or build
nests.2 In the United States, more than 100 million cows, sows, sheep and
5 billion chickens, (mostly hens and chicks) are raised and slaughtered
for food production each year.3 Mechanistic, assembly-line processes,
designed for efficient, economical and ever increasing production
dominate the husbandry of these animals.4 The infliction of pain and
slaughter in the pursuit of profit and technological advancements is
justified through constructing the experimental subject or farm animal as
other. Being other means that animals are constructed and interpreted as
being without desires, interests or feelings. On what basis are they
judged as without these qualities? Gruen argues that the symbolic
operation of the categories woman and animal satisfy equivalent
predominantly utilitarian functions in Western patriarchal societies.
Their similarities are presumed to be natural, which disguises both
motive and investment of speakers and discourses that construct/ed the
natural connection. Theoretical and practical correlations between
woman and animal are manifest in everyday life and in the ideology
that justifies and preserves their submission to masculine authority.5
For instance, scientific experimentation regarding reproduction has been
justified on the basis that potential benefits outweigh emotional and
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physical suffering. The human contraceptive pill can increase the risk of
blood clots and heart attack. IUDs can induce haemorrhages and bring
about infertility. Hormonal treatment has uncalculated short and long
term effects. Surgical intervention and manipulation with the risks of
anaesthetisation and infection are all ‘justifiable risks’. How is it that the
failure rate of contraceptive technologies has contributed to the infertility
that reproductive technologies are designed to address? The basis for
justifying these technologies provides the answer.
A fundamental basis that justifies this way of thinking is derived from
traditional Western philosophy. The systematic connections inherent in
the dichotomisation of subject/other, polarises man/woman,
nature/culture and human animal/non-human animal. This polarisation
situates woman
and animal in a secondary, subordinate and
discriminated location - in relation to man. Dichotomisation is not
derived from essential biological properties, it is a learned mode of
thinking, perceiving and knowing that transforms reality into static,
oppositional and hierarchical conceptual categories. These conceptual
categories are confined to the manifestation of specific ideas and images
in regard to subjectivity and identity. It is the constructed categories of
subjectivity and identity that are the focus of racism, sexism and
speciesism.
The connection between categories of subjectivity and identity is neither
random nor natural. Inherent to Cartesian dualism is the disassociation of
mind from body6 and the connection of mind with culture and man. This
network of connections excludes any being that is not cultured, white,
middle (or upper) class, Western and a citizen. Women, animals, people
of other races are all necessarily excluded. Descartes orchestrated a
network of strategic connections that systematically excluded woman regardless of whether this was his intent, it was a consequence. The
exclusion of woman was based on her constructed and assumed
association with nature7 and the body. My argument is that the exclusion
of woman is connected to other forms of exclusion. Cartesian
epistemological paradigms provide a basis with which to justify the
exclusionary concepts of racism, sexism and speciesism.
Cartesianism is based on the polarisation of terms. It posits the
privileged designation of positive for one term (in this context: subject,
man and human). The privileged classification is dependent on the
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negation or oppression and, or, suppression of its opposite term (other,
woman and animal). This necessary relationship is one of determined
advantage or disadvantage. This relationship is central to speciesism and
sexism, and it is a primary reason for the indefensibility of speciesism.
Another reason is that while the consequences of negation, oppression or
suppression are visible the strategic connections that inform these
processes are invisible. Debates about abortion, reproductive technology
and the availability of contraception for women - in both Western and
non-Western cultures - provide an example of the binary of
visibility/invisibility. Denial of these services and technologies is
arguably a visible form of oppression, but the processes that inform the
politicisation of females as a producer of progeny, food, sexual desire
and so on are invisible. ‘Natural’ vocation, economic rationality, beauty
and religious faith are indicative of some of the beliefs and processes
used to justify mandates on reproductive technology. Economic
rationalism is exemplified in the following: 'The dual aims of veal
production are firstly, to produce a calf of the greatest weight in the
shortest possible time and secondly, to keep its meat as light coloured as
possible to fulfil the consumers requirement. All at a profit
commensurate to the risk and investment involved.8 The same processes
of economic rationality are used to justify a variety of discriminatory
treatments from the immobilisation and over-feeding of veal calves to
negating the value of ‘women’s work’ because it would unbalance the
national economy. None of these terms are isolated, objective, neutral
concepts. Each term has a complex history of associations that
predetermine specific responses.
Arguing that each term has a complex history of associations and
consequences is best explained according to Foucauldian theory. For
Foucault, social formations - in combination with his classificatory
systems of thought - are the current aftermath of former struggles. These
classificatory systems are rendered invisible through processes of
naturalisation.9 In other words interpretation of the networks that link
exceptions and qualifications to normative evaluative classificatory
systems is required. The rendering invisible of classificatory systems of
thought means that deconstruction of these processes of naturalisation
can be used to reveal ‘invisible’ organising elements and principles. The
implicit messages encoded within the concepts of speciesism and
sexism can be rendered visible because systems of knowledge are
predicated on invisible organising terms, that is, categories of
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knowledges. Decoding is possible partly because classificatory systems
of thought are not atemporal, ahistorical and continual. They are subject
to socio-political and economic struggle. This means that the occurrence
of changes may render obvious previously invisible organising elements
within systems of knowledges.
Foucault would argue that the intimate reciprocal associations between
related concepts in dualisms (for example woman, animal, natural,
manipulable ) create subordinated, habituated, docile bodies that are
brought closer to an idealised standard. Processes of reciprocity,
elementary to dualist concepts, instigate the automatic and perpetual
functioning of distinctions based on concepts of ‘normality’,
‘abnormality’, race, sex and species. For instance, idealised notions of
‘femininity’ require specific repetitive practices.10 Romanticised
versions of animal behaviour illustrate how culturally generated
representations of subjectivity assume the validity of ‘truthfulness’ when
they are in accord with publicly predetermined notions of ‘who we are’
and ‘who or what they are’.The pastoral image of a dairy cow wandering
around a lush green pasture - featuring in butter and milk advertisements
- is an example of a romanticised version of reality. The industrialisation
of the dairy business means an intense five year cycle of pregnancy and
hyperlactaction, after which the dairy cow is slaughtered. Mastitis,
infected teats and internal cannibalisation of body tissue are common
effects of dairy industrialisation.11 The mediatory process involved in
feminising woman and romanticising animals indicates the gradual and
cumulative objectification of woman and animal.
Objectification is achieved through the formation of specific knowledges
by discourses of power. These formulated knowledges have the effect of
dictating desired and non-desired characteristics thereby classifying a
specific norm as preferential. The racial norm of whiteness is perhaps the
most common and one of the most exclusive normative characteristics
preferred by Caucasian Western cultures. Race, education, location and
communicative abilities, to name a few qualifying characteristics, can
automatically deny or warrant membership to the preferred norm. When
certain characteristics are privileged and combined they reinforce each
other in a circular process, multiplying their individual effects. These
circular processes, which are intersubjective and interactive, produce the
appearance of normality, a major consequence of which is invisibility.
The invisibility of circular processes means the processes that produce
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norms are themselves unapparent, so it is difference that is remarked on
and set apart. In other words the absence of difference represents a
privileged condition. In this way psychical characteristics are connected
to anatomical features in a determining manner that facilitates the
categorisation of a living being into a type, a species. Even though
animal and woman may appear to be totally disparate concepts, their
categorisation as other is a parallel that identifies their mutual relations.
Categorisation as other is processed through discourses of power.
Inclusion within the category of other is influenced by motive and
investment. For example, investment and authority is evident in the
following explicit, supposedly guiltless, admission of cruelty. They hate
it! The pigs just hate it! And I suppose we could probably do without
tail-docking if we gave them more room, because they don’t get so crazy
and mean when they have more space. With enough room, they’re
actually quite nice animals. But we can’t afford it. These buildings cost a
lot.' A non-speciesist discourse would not justify death from porcine
stress syndrome because it 'in no way nullify[s] the extra return obtained
from the higher total output'.12
The relationship of the subject13 to the power/knowledge network, and
therefore the motive and investment of the subject, must be established.
Though he did not suggest this, a Foucauldian genealogy of connections
can be used to make visible the connections between the supposedly
disparate concepts of speciesism and sexism thereby manifesting the
active and systematic processes of participation and motivation. Both
these processes are fundamental to producing coherent knowledges; in
other words, to make visible, and thereby accountable specific discourses
and speakers who/that have the power to construct, categorise and
determine meaning and to conceal their investments while doing so.
It is the sexed and embodied subject (for example, the pig-farmer) who
experiences and practises the ideas that guarantee the connection
between knowledge and practice.14 Open declaration of intent and
context by the speaker of discourse may alleviate the deception inherent
in the existing (Western) power/knowledge networks. However, it does
not explain either how or why porcine stress syndrome can be an
acceptable factor in the pork industry. I agree with Althusser’s assertion,
that the way in which we understand the experience of ourselves (such as
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our subjecthood) is directly related to pre-determined constructions of
social categories within specific ideological frameworks.15
For Althusser, the concrete existence of ideology16 is manifested in
systems of belief, (dead meat is necessary to human health) everyday
practices (tail-docking, debeaking), institutions (agribusinesses,
supermarkets) and social structures (economic rationality justifies
abusive farming practices) which function to rationalise and justify
widespread values (animal value is judged according to use) and
conventions (animals don’t feel pain). These systems have the potential
to render invisible or distort the real operations of power.17 This means
that ideology produces, or interpellates individuals as historically and
culturally specific subjects.18 The concepts of sexism and speciesism
transform the concrete existence of women and animals and reconstruct
them as part of the social totality, partly because woman and animal,
historically, represent a category, a social relation, not an individual. By
which I mean the actuality of woman and animal in real, material social,
political and environmental discourses do not get translated into the
social anthropocentric constructed totality. Althusser demonstrates that
categories of thought
(sexuality, race, animality, identity and
subjecthood) need to be historically and culturally contextualized, to
prevent uncritical acceptance, and to render visible the investments of
ideological and power relations.19
This is evident in the way increasingly varied types of animal research
are revealing different forms of social relations, tool making, and
communication amongst animals. Cooperative hunting through division
of labour and coordinative signalling by Aplomado falcons20 is one
example of animal social relationships. Another is the manipulation by
beaver family units of their local environment.21 Tool use can be
demonstrated by the sea otters use of stones to hammer loose molluscs
and abalones.22 A good example of animal communication as a two-way
process is provided by the semantic alarm calls of vervet monkeys that
indicate different types of danger and clearly generate specific responses
depending on whether the predator is a leopard, eagle or python.23
These diverse characteristics (social relations, tool making, and
communication), previously the domain of the exclusively ‘cultured’ are
not correspondingly represented in our treatment, relationship or attitude
to animals. Similarly, women are increasingly diversifying in social and
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political arenas, but this is also under represented in our systems of
social knowledges.
With the help of theoreticians like Foucault and Althusser, it is possible
to argue that systems of knowledges, discourses and concepts
interconnect. Therefore, we can expose weak links, or generate
alternative pathways. One could produce counter practices, counter
strategies and counter discourses in an effort to re-direct the existing
strategies of power and ideology at a local and conjunctural level, rather
than simply trying to eliminate them. Both a rationalist and an empiricist
view would reject Foucault’s genealogy as a method of producing
knowledge because it does not prove continuity between historical
events, nor does it focus on origins or causal relationships and so cannot
produce essential singular truths.
Deconstructionism, however, provides the opportunity to acknowledge
and
describe
without
recreating
conceptual
oppositions.
Deconstructionists claim that meaning and interpretation are produced
through the artificial and constructed contrasts of dichotomous terms.
Derridaen deconstructionism argues that analysis of the marginalised
dichotomous concept and the characteristics of its exclusion, prove that
the privileged concept derives its meaning and pre-eminence through the
contrast and suppression of the marginalised concept.24 Therefore the
privileged concept does not achieve either unmitigated identity or
conceptual absoluteness; instead its parasitic and contaminatory nature
becomes evident. Deconstructionism could provide a new and positive
discourse of the body and of the subject, which would be socially and
historically contextual and non-dualistic in its approach. This would be
possible because the unity, continuity and coherence of the body and the
subject can be shown to have no natural biological pre-determined basis.
Deconstruction argues that natural biological pre-determination is an
effect of traditional discourses of knowledge. If speciesism is seen to be
an effect of traditional discourses of knowledge then speciesism is a
constructed and pre-meditated position. It follows that a constructed
position can be broken down into its constitutive elements and its
foundational networks of bias and profit made visible.
Systematic networks of bias and profit are paralleled within the
construction of sexism. It is not difficult to find feminist criticism25
which is directed against defining woman on the basis of her body.
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Biologically determined paradigms rationalise objectification and
utilisation of woman (as property) solely on the basis of what she can
produce for man. This last point is equally true for female animals.26 In
response, a proponent of factory farming might argue that it is the
female animals’ biological reproductive characteristics which dictate
their predominance in ‘modern’ farming practices: 'The modern layer is,
after all, only a very efficient converting machine, changing the raw
material - feeding stuffs - into the finished product - the egg - less, of
course, maintenance requirements.'27 This quote, from a farm industry
trade journal, wherein one might expect to find the most favourable
accounts of the farming industry, demonstrates the Cartesian
interpretation of body as machine . The attitude expressed in this quote is
not dissimilar to descriptions of the female uterus as a ‘vessel’ or
‘storage space’ passively receptive to the ‘active’ male seed. These
similarities correlate with the Western historical tradition which
conceptualises the body as a machine. 'Thus I may consider the human
body as a machine, fitted together and made up of bones, sinews,
muscles, veins, blood and skin in such way that, even if there were no
mind in it, it would still carry out all the operations that, as things are, do
not depend on the command of the will, nor, therefore, on the mind'.28
Inherent to the concept of body as machine are assumptions that help
explain the parallel treatment of female humans and female animals. The
most common assumption about machines is their specific functionality
added to which is the value, use and productivity that can be gained from
the possession of the machine. Fundamental to the concept of body as
machine is Descartes' disassociation of mind and body. I am not that set
of limbs called the human body. For Descartes the mind (or
consciousness) is unextended and indivisible, while the body (or matter)
is both extended and divisible.29 When this divisibility is applied to
animals, it supports their exploitation because fundamental to
Cartesianism is the pre-eminent value of mind (and soul) and the
subjugation of body to the mind. In the context of animals this translates
as the subjugation and expendability of animals to the interests of man.
This ‘rationalisation’ denies an inherent value of animals in themselves,
to each other and in relation to the ecosystem. Values which, a nonanthropocentric viewpoint might argue could outweigh the needs and
wants of man and justify a balanced, mutually beneficial relationship
between humans and animals.
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Human-animal relations are widespread, diverse and longstanding as
indicated by Native American names such as Running Deer and
Hawkeye,30 Ancient Egyptian religious beliefs featuring human-animal
hybrid gods, seeing-eye-dogs and patents that have been taken out on
genetically altered pigs with a human immune system.31 These humananimal relationships, indicate that crossing the human-animal divide is
considered justifiable if it is to human advantage. A contradiction exists
in the sometime separation and at other times combination of human and
animal. We separate and hierarchise our relationships on the basis of
difference and at the same time cite our mutual compatibility as the basis
for combining human with animal. For example, consider the
relationship between owner and domestic pet; farmer and commercial
product; and animal donor organs and human health. In these cases
human and animal subjectivity is a flexible, manipulable construct. The
relationships between types of discrimination and prejudice are mutually
supportive and may be seen in the way the human-animal hierarchy is
used to confirm racist human-human hierarchies. The stereotypical
representation of non-caucasians as ‘blacks’ originates from falsely
constructed stereotypes about animals. They set up ‘black’ and ‘beastly’
as exact synonyms, evidenced in the following book title: The Negro: A
Beast..32 Humans distinguish ourselves from all non-human animals on
the basis that we are superior, mentally, genetically, socially and
spiritually. These distinctions are thought to exist, even though humans
are genetically and behaviourally closer to primates, than primates are to
amphibians. Unless it is to human advantage, we disregard animal
welfare, intelligence and wellbeing because we maintain a hierarchical
paradigm that stipulates a superior/inferior divide.
As Midgley argues, speciesism presupposes a massive, hierarchised
distinction between humans and non-humans.33 This distinction
determines how we define and practice morality and it determines how
we judge the importance, utility and value of any non-human. 'Degrees
of capacity on either side of the human species-barrier are not allowed
to affect this sharp divide.'34 Importance, utility and value are decided
and classified in terms of human benefit and advantage. Value is judged
only in human terms. Vivisectionists argue for continual animal
experimentation on the grounds of human to animal similarities. At the
same time, they contrarily claim an uncrossable divide between humans
and non-humans.
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This divide justifies treatment of non-humans that is considered cruelly
untenable for humans.35 The well-being and well-fare of the non-human
is inconsequential in comparison to the privilege and preference
accorded to humanness; 'animals used in biomedical research should not
be considered as mere animals but rather as standardised biological
research tools'.36 The implicit construction is that, after all, tools are for
human use, advantage and profit. This perspective is completely
anthropocentric: it is the elevation of humans as superior to animals
regardless of context. There is no context left for the needs and wellbeing of animals to be considered in preference to humans. Extinction of
an entire species is possible on these terms. Nor is speciesism limited by
time, geography or culture. For instance, the expanding human
population in the Mediterranean reduced animal habitats and
extinguished lions and leopards by 200BC in Greece and Asia Minor.
The last pair of Auks (a flightless seabird) were killed in 1844 in Iceland.
On Mauritius, the ground nesting dodo was extinct by 1681. The North
American passenger pigeon thought to have numbered about 5 billion
was hunted to extinction between 1630 and 1914. One animal species
every four years became extinct between 1600-1900. By the 1970’s
about 1000 animal species were made extinct each year. It is estimated
that 20 percent of the worlds animal and plant species will be extinct
before 2000.37 This version of human superiority justifies cruel and
abusive practices towards animals in the pursuit of knowledge and profit.
Speciesist practices are maintained through ignorance, isolation,
legislation and secrecy which protect agricultural industries and research
institutions from a critical and punitive public scrutiny. 38
Anthropocentric thought requires animals to conform to human standards
of intelligence and communication, if we are to extend to them human
rights and inherent value. I find anthropocentricity problematic on two
counts, firstly because it does not recognise or accommodate non-human
standards of intelligence, communication, rights and value. Secondly it
establishes a singular standard for human rights and human values which
are pre-eminent, universal and absolute. These characteristics exclude
possibilities for change, difference and alterity - amongst humans, let
alone recognising the possibility for parallel or concurrent rights, values
and intelligences by other species. This perspective maintains that
animals lack the ability to think, to emote or to consider consequences,
supporting the presumption that humans are superior. It continues,
contrary to current research into non-human behaviour and cognition.
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Herman’s39 bottle nose dolphin experiments indicate, amongst other
things: understanding of word order, observational learning, self-training
and the refusal to respond to nonsense commands. Given these and other
empirically validated examples it seems advisable to dispute the
human/animal divide and to examine what humans regard as
communication and understanding and the capacity to abstract.
Regan and Singer reproduce the idea that rationality and the capacity to
abstract are essential qualities and so they indirectly support speciesism.
My reasons for this claim are twofold. Firstly, their dual focus on
rationality reproduces a biased, normative, hierarchical reason/emotion
dichotomy. Secondly, if abstraction is the basis for speciesism then the
consequences of speciesism are distanced to the point of virtual
ineffectuality. The separation and distancing of theory and practice is
self-defeating and self-perpetuating. Considering speciesism outside of
its practical application removes responsibility to act, or change, through
disassociation of the self from speciesist practices.
I have argued that the theory and practice of speciesism are
interdependent. By which I mean the justification for abusive factory
farming practices is derived from the belief that animals are inferior to
humans. It places the onus of proof on the animal or on the human to
prove otherwise.
Why do all non-human animals have to compete with human animals in
a contest for equality? As Midgley argues, the idea that moral agents
represent a chosen archetype and interact within a contractual circle of
morality on an equal basis is self-defeating.40 The notion that all moral
agents must be of a certain type implies circumscribed boundaries. These
boundaries exclude or deny moral agency to any being that does not
comply with pre-determined qualities. Rather the onus should be on
those (human animals) who have the authority and power to extend
respect and kindness. If a reciprocal arrangement is required, then it can
be justified on the basis of what associated species can contribute to
human welfare and well-being.
I do not know, however, whether I would go so far as to suggest that this
be our Kantian duty. Kant’s notion of duty includes the polarisation of
duty and inclination, and the inherent valuation of intent as of greater
significance than the consequences of the act.41 Instead I lean towards
Hegel’s moral consequentialism which stipulates consequences must be
taken into account.42 For Hegel, rational (social, economic, legal,
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occupational and political) institutions form a system that is
paradigmatic of objective ethical life. In turn, the individual is
predisposed to behave in accordance with norms and conventions
proposed by those rational social (etc)institutions.43 Hegel would deny
moral rights and moral acts to animals because they lack rationality and
freedom. However, his idea that the nature of a moral action must
include any unintentional or unforseen consequences that develop
condemns the maltreatment of animals by factory farmer, and researcher
as immoral - even if they believe in the greater good or the inability of
animals to experience pain. It follows that what is expected of each
individual is context dependent, which means that motive and intent are
context dependent.
Benton’s position is context dependent. He rejects Regan’s distinctions
between types of moral patients and rejects Singer’s theory because it is
too difficult to weigh up different types of pleasure and pain. He argues
that human animals and non-human animals are all embedded within
ecological niches. We cannot abstract individuals from their
embededness because it can lead to misguided actions. For Benton the
individual is indissolubly bound up in their social and ecological
position, relationships and conditions of life. Benton argues that focusing
on, or isolating, specific characteristics or qualities such as a ‘rationality’
or ‘emotion’ results is an incomplete solution. Human-animal and nonhuman-animal embededness must be considered in their own particular
contexts and relationships. Social relations are not necessarily species
specific consider, for example, the ownership of a pet kitten by the
gorilla Koko.44 This was a relationship which defies commonly accepted
boundaries for friendship and ownership. Furthermore, the satisfaction of
need is essential for survival and well being of individuals. Benton is
aware of the difficulty in distinguishing between genuine and superficial
needs however he does not give any clear criteria for deciding between a
conflict of needs. This is problematic because needs are Benton’s basis
for morally valid claims.45 For Benton both human animals and nonhuman animals can be in relationships and therefore can be moral
agents.. Accordingly, a moral claim which meets the needs of humans at
the expense of animals could be presented using Benton’s moral
paradigm.
The exclusionism and denigration inherent to racism and sexism has a
custom-made feel to it, limiting the scope of rights and moral agency. to
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particular kinds of subjects. The non-included subjects are denied and
excluded by definition, simply because they are not white men.46
Humans comprise one species, that is, one biological classification.
Racism and sexism, referring as they do to human-to-human interaction
on a cultural or (biological) sex difference are defined and reproduced in
human terms, therefore they are in a sense restricted to a human context.
This is not to say that the consequences of racism are determined solely
by race. As I argued previously (when discussing the dichotomous
aspects of these terms) the concepts of racism and sexism do not operate
alone, they materialise historical and contemporary beliefs and bias.
Speciesism covers a broader area than the concepts of racism and
sexism. It relates to the immense scale of difference between humans
and non-human animals. It is a classic example of anthropocentric
thinking which blends the multiple, complex, varied possibilities in the
animal macrocosmos into a single category: animal, specifically a nonhuman animal. The relative homogeneity of human habitats in
comparison to the heterogeneity of non-human-animal habitat
requirements should be enough to recognise that the anthropocentric
nature of the term 'speciesism' renders it invalid and indefensible as a
position.
Unfortunately, most people would not consider it an adequate rebuttal to
speciesism. This is because discourses of power are not disembodied
structures that simply produce knowledge and meaning. Each concept
must be located and contextualised because it is not an isolated
neutrality. If we argue that each individual does not create their own
knowledges and truth then meaning is the property and product of the
social community. However this is not to say that knowledge is
disconnected from speakers and discourse, instead it is to say that
knowledge is not independent of theory and subjectivity. It follows that
acknowledging that subjectivity is constructed is required to balance the
alleged guaranty and intellectual appeal of knowledge.
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BOOK REVIEWS
Candland, Douglas Keith, Feral Children and Clever Animals:
Reflections on Human Nature, xiii + 411pp. (Oxford University Press,
Oxford,1993).
Feral Children and Clever Animals purports to be about attempts by
humans to know about themselves by trying to understand the minds of
other beings: feral children and animals, and at least in the first half, it
fulfils this aim quite well. The discussion of the animal studies however
involves very little reflection on the investigators and is mainly confined
to a summary of the published results along with some questions about
what they might mean.
The 'feral children' who are the focus of the first half of the book are
Peter, Victor, Kaspar Hauser, Amala and Kamala. Candland looks at the
aims of the 18th and 19th century investigators of these children rather
than the specifics of the children's behaviour or abilities. It is the minds
of the investigators rather than the feral children that he sees of interest.
This is a novel slant on these stories and it allows Candland to present
his view of the history of psychology.
According to Candland, those who studied Peter discovered in the 18th
century, were primarily concerned with the question, 'what behaviour is
innate and what behaviour is learned?' and the social/political
ramifications of the answer. I wonder whether this description is
accurate given that the emphasis on behaviour seems to be a feature of a
much more recent psychology. It is clear however that the general
question about what in humans is innate and what is learned was an
important one at the time. Itard's study of Victor, Candland tells us, was
premised on a division between the senses, the intellect and the
emotions, foreshadowing the idea of psychology as being composed of
three functions that can be studied separately. Kasper Hauser is included
in Candland's reflections as a feral child but he was not strictly one. He
was raised by humans in confinement and with minimal sustenance. The
discussion here is inconclusive as it seems no one attempted a study of
Kasper Hauser's abilities, the 'experts' being more concerned with the
illegality of confinement.
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Amala and Kamala, both reared by wolves were investigated to
determine how or whether culture could be taught. The mother wolf was
cruelly killed in front of them. Reverend Singh, the chief investigator
wrote that up to three months after capture they showed a dislike for
everything human and Amala died shortly after capture. It is curious that
Candland makes nothing of these events. In fact the book engages only
very fleetingly with moral issues in the conclusion.
Candland introduces a discussion of four directions in contemporary
psychology: the notion of measuring mental ability, psychoanalysis,
behaviourism and phenomenology. Psychoanalysis is presented through
Freud's account of Little Hans and many key concepts are clearly
portrayed. Candland insists on the utility rather than the veracity of
psychoanalysis, incorrectly I think, attributing such a perspective to
Freud.
Supposedly leading into his discussion of behaviourism, Candland
outlines the accounts of the abilities of the horses, Clever Hans, Zarif
and Muhamed, suggesting that experts' descriptions had a great deal to
do with their expectations. Interestingly Candland argues for the
cleverness of Hans on grounds other than those provided by
contemporary experts. Behaviourism is in fact barely mentioned.
Phenomenology is introduced with a discussion of the reading abilities
of certain dogs and the investigators' attempts to communicate via words
with the dogs. Candland argues that the questions of those who studied
these horses and dogs move away from those asked of the feral children
towards an emphasis on communication. The idea of a mental ladder
which arranges animal species by their intelligence is then introduced
looking at the studies of chimpanzees early this century in the United
States and Garner's attempts to study chimpanzee communication by
living in Africa and interacting with them in their natural state. This is
fascinating material though received sceptically at the time by Western
scientists as Garner's observational reports were mixed up with reports
by Africans presumed incapable of credible testimony. Thorndike's work
on the learning abilities of a range of animals is outlined. The criticism
that such laboratory work is flawed because of the artificial nature of the
test situation is elaborated. It is interesting to note however that
Thorndike's studies of monkey's learning abilities prompted his claim in
1901 that 'the monkey justifies his inclusion with man in a separate
mental genus'. The experimental work of Haggerty and Hamilton with
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monkeys early in this century is also discussed. The final hundred pages
deals with recent attempts at communication between people and apes,
carefully unearthing the assumptions often made here. The Kellogs'
study of the chimpanzee Gua in their home and the Hayes' study of the
chimpanzee Viki also living in their home revealed a great deal about
chimpanzees' abilities but the studies failed in their attempts to teach
human speech. The Gardners' attempts to communicate with the
chimpanzee Washoe and the Patterson's with the gorilla Koko, both met
with much greater success using sign language. Terrace's study of the
chimpanzee Nim also revealed Nim's competence in using signs but
Terrace was unsure of Nim's ability to create a sentence and generated
some scepticism about ape/human communication studies in general.
The second generation of chimpanzees in communication studies which
Candland claims focused on meaning, are then outlined. The Premacks'
studies of Sarah and other chimpanzees provide credible examples of
meaningful communications especially related to lying and deception.
Duane Rumbaugh and others' attempts to communicate with another
chimpanzee also using an artificial language and the even more
surprising results with the chimpanzees Sherman and Austin with the
investigator Savage Rumbaugh also help overcome earlier scepticism
and generate more sophisticated questions. The research with the bonobo
Kanzi is only briefly mentioned which is disappointing given the extent
and originality of his purported communication with Sue Savage
Rumbaugh.
It is good to bring all this empirical material together but it is only
related to the psychologies in the vaguest of ways; for example, the
accounts of animals' communications often bring in perceptions and
phenomenology is concerned with the study of perceptions. Candland's
conclusion is surely correct however that there is much more to find out
about animal/ human communication and that the studies should take
more account of how human categories of thought affect outcomes.
Candland is an oblique sort of thinker making his writing unpredictable
and interesting but also a little frustrating if you prefer writers to follow
their aims in a straight forward manner. The book is unwieldy but it
opens up reflection in a multiplicity of directions. Even though it is
already a long book it would have been good to consider the story of
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Jeanie, a modern Kasper Hauser and the investigations into
human/dolphin communication along with the material Candland covers.
Denise Russell
Rollin, Bernard E., The Frankenstein Syndrome: Ethical and Social
Issues in the Genetic Engineering of Animals, xiv + 241pp. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1995.
Bernard Rollin is well known for his philosophical writings concerning
humans' moral obligations to animals (see Animal Rights and Human
Morality, Second edition, (N.Y: Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1992) and
The Unheeded Cry, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). The
Unheeded Cry is a brilliant analysis of the culture of science and how it
works against the interests of animals. Rollin is not as opposed to the
genetic engineering of animals as these earlier books might lead one to
suspect. In The Frankenstein Syndrome he presents such engineering as a
neutral tool which may be used wisely or not. A suspicion falls over this
approach if we substitute 'humans' for 'animals' here. It seems that it is
not possible to view the genetic engineering of humans as a mere tool.
Yet Rollin comes close to this when he claims that there is nothing
inherently wrong with human genetic manipulation. Perhaps this just
highlights the need to speak about specific procedures. While Rollin's
discussion does get down to specifics in relation to animals he apparently
regards all procedures as mere tools even when these involve for
instance, the creation of animal models of human disease.
Rollin is concerned that our ideas about genetic engineering of animals
not be dominated by the 'Frankenstein Myth'; that the creation of new
life by scientific intervention must have 'hellish' consequences. He
believes that the genetic engineering of animals has 'patent and
incalculable social and economic benefits'. He seems to suggest that
animals may benefit too but he does not clarify this beyond some brief
speculations about possibly in the future breeding animals to better suit
current farming practices, e.g.. more content battery chickens, or
introducing genes for disease resistance.
Rollin also states that genetic engineering of animals cannot now be
stopped arguing that it is too simple and relatively inexpensive to
accomplish, and if it were to be banned in the U.S., it would be carried
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out in less restrictive environments elsewhere. He believes that control of
the technology is vital because it has the capacity to 'lead to a
proliferation of animal suffering many orders of magnitude greater than
what we have seen before'.
Rollin asks why the moral issues connected with genetic engineering
have not been brought forward by the scientific community itself. He
suggests that it is very difficult for those immersed in a field to gain the
necessary distance for such reflection, that the scientific ideology
outlined in The Unheeded Cry still dominates, unreceptive to moral
questions. Rollin argues that science necessarily involves values, e.g.
epistemic ones but also 'as a social phenomenon and human practice,
science cannot be isolated from social morality'.
Rollin criticizes claims that genetic engineering is intrinsically wrong.
While in general Rollin's arguments work well, there are two problematic
areas. Firstly, in arguing against Rifkin's purported link between
reductionism and genetic engineering, Rollin says that reductionism is
metaphysically, epistemologically and even morally wrong. However he
asserts that genetic engineering need not be connected to reductionism, a
point with which I agree, yet it seems to be denied by Rollin in his
Appendix describing genetic engineering. Here he says: 'The blueprint
for both species' commonality and individuality is carried by the genes,
which instruct and regulate the animals in how to develop, grow and
form throughout life'.
Secondly, in his discussion of environmental philosophy and genetic
engineering, Rollin makes several fallacious moves, most notably not
taking account of the variety of approaches which constitute
'environmental philosophy'. His critique of Holmes Rolston's account of
intrinsic value of natural objects is well worked out, but Val Plumwood's
position in Feminism and the Mastery of Nature is not so vulnerable to
attack. Rollin's approach here reflects the long standing and unnecessary
conflict between philosophers concerned about animals and those
concerned about the environment.
A lengthy section in the book examines the potential dangers arising
from genetic engineering of animals for humans and ecosystems. This is
wide-ranging and well done except that the tone in places is rather too
jocular for the subject matter. There is a strong argument for public
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involvement in decisions about acceptance, rejection or monitoring of
genetic engineering of animals and some practical suggestions for
regulatory structures. He points out the lack of current regulation in the
commercial domain.
About one third of the book is given over to ethical considerations in
relation to animals that arise from genetic engineering and some very
sensible discussion of how to provoke changes in attitudes. Rollin claims
that he is moving beyond talk of kindness vs cruelty to develop an ethics
of rights applicable to animals. However he does not answer or even
discuss the hard questions about a rights-based philosophy. Some law
reforms are suggested which if implemented, would provide some good
safeguards. These reforms are not contingent upon the acceptance of a
rights philosophy.
As one of the first major works devoted to ethical questions concerning
the use of animals in genetic engineering this book is to be praised. It is
very informative and provides a good start to thinking about
philosophical issues. As an attempt to explode the Frankenstein Myth
however the book is a failure
Denise Russell
BOOK NOTES
Masson, Jeffrey and McCarthy, Susan,When Elephants Weep: The
Emotional Lives of Animals , 268pp. (Jonathan Cape, London,1994).
Masson, famous for his trenchant critiques of psychiatry, together with
McCarthy, presents a fascinating series of accounts of emotions in
animals. The main part of the book is organised around descriptions of
fear, hope, rage, cruelty, friendship, grief, sadness, happiness,
compassion, altruism, shame and justice. It is valuable to have this
material collected together, some of it is well known, much of it is not.
Detailed notes and references are included. When Animals Weep lacks
philosophical sophistication: the core concept of emotion is inadequately
conceptualized and there is only superficial argument concerning the
attribution of emotions or feelings to animals. Yet it is difficult to put
down.
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Adams Carol J. and Donovan, Josephine, editors, Animals and Women:
Feminist Theoretical Explorations, ix + 381pp., (Duke University Press,
Durham, 1995.
Animals and Women is a collection of 13 essays by 13 authors on the
interlocking oppressions of sexism and speciesism. A few of the essays
have a literary focus but otherwise the specific topics are very diverse
applying the general theme to science, crime, hunting, pornography,
abortion, farm animals, and politics. Lynda Birke's essay ,' Exploring the
Boundaries: Feminism, Animals and Science', develops an important
critical perspective towards the reluctance of much of the feminist
literature to challenge conventional ideas about animals. The book
contains a very useful nine page bibiography of feminist approaches to
animal issues.
Noble, William and Davidson, Iain, Human Evolution, Language and
Mind: A Psychological and Archaeological Inquiry, xiii + 272pp.,
Cambridge University Press,1966.
Noble is a psychologist and Davidson an archaeologist and they attempt
to unite the two disciplines to outline the process of evolutionary
emergence of the phenomena of mind, language, and 'higher
consciousness'. The focus is on humans and other apes and on what
might count as evidence for language acquisition. This is a careful study
with some interesting conclusions. The Savage-Rumbaugh research
findings with Kanzi are discussed but thought not to be generalizable to
wild primates or the common ancestor as Kanzi's environment (involving
human communication) is different. Noble and Davidson argue that it is
the human nature of the interactive context in the case of Kanzi that
engenders the powers and capacities of mind expressed in that creature.
The question then shifts from 'can bonobos use language?' to 'is Kanzi
human?' A positive answer to this question would preserve the authors'
belief that language is the key to human mentality. It would be
interesting to juxtapose the direction of this argument with the dolphin
studies reported for instance in L. Herman, 'Receptive Competencies in
Language-Trained Animals' in Rosenblatt, J et al eds., Advances in the
Study of Behavior. It is not quite so plausible to think about of dolphins
as human.
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